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RECESSIONS AND THE SOCIAL SAFETY 
NET: THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX 
AS A COUNTERCYCLICAL FISCAL 
STABILIZER 
Brian Galle* & Jonathan Klick** 
As recent events illustrate, state finances are procyclical: during recessions, 
state revenues crash, worsening the effects of economic downturns. This problem 
is well known, yet persistent. We argue here that, in light of predictable federal-
ism and political economy dynamics, states will be unable to change this situation 
on their own. Additionally, we note that many possible federal remedies may re-
sult in worse problems, such as by creating moral hazard that would induce 
states to take on excessively risky policy, both fiscal and otherwise. Thus, we ar-
gue that policymakers should consider so-called “automatic” stabilizers, such as 
are found in the federal tax system, and we offer original empirical evidence that 
these stabilizers can have significant fiscal impact. 
Our evidence focuses on the federal alternative minimum tax (AMT). We 
present an argument from microeconomic foundations suggesting that the AMT 
has potentially salutary—and heretofore unrecognized—effects that counteract 
pathologies of state budgets over the business cycle. AMT liability increases with 
income, and acts to eliminate federal tax subsidies for state revenue raising. Thus 
in flush times, when a state’s income grows so that the AMT hits more state resi-
dents, state spending becomes more expensive as the federal tax subsidy for state 
and local taxes is reduced. Conversely, when state fiscal health deteriorates, the 
federal tax subsidy grows as fewer state residents fall under the AMT, boosting 
taxpayer support for state spending. This stabilizing mechanism has the potential 
to overcome problems state politicians face committing to saving during boom 
times and spending during bust times.  
We present empirical evidence suggesting that the AMT does indeed provide 
some degree of fiscal stabilization in accordance with microeconomic theory. We 
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also provide policy suggestions regarding how the AMT could be modified to le-
verage this stabilization effect. 
Calls to “reform” the AMT predate the recent economic downturn. AMT 
reform has appeared in many congressional stimulus proposals, but significant 
cutbacks are unlikely as federal deficits are projected to grow for the foreseeable 
future. Our argument here implies that any AMT reform effort should consider 
whether the AMT’s stabilizer function could be replaced by any other viable me-
chanism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Economic downturns make for tough fiscal times for state and local gov-
ernments. State fiscal belt-tightening has the potential to drive up unemploy-
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ment and drive down consumer demand, further slowing the economy.1 
Throughout the recent recession, a steady stream of headlines warned that state 
budget cuts threatened to delay economic recovery.2 The crisis underscores that 
any sensible strategy for managing the ups and downs of the business cycle 
should include some provision for ensuring that state revenues will ease the 
pain of recessions and slowdowns, rather than compounding it.3  
In this Article, we argue that states are poorly situated to make such plans 
for themselves, and that many conventional forms of federal subsidy would risk 
worsening the problems that states face. However, the path to a well-designed 
subsidy already has been laid in a surprising place: the federal alternative  min-
imum tax (AMT).4 We investigate empirically the impact of the AMT, and 
suggest some modest alterations that would make it a more effective stabilizer 
for unsteady state economies. 
The Article makes three key contributions to the literature, as well as some 
smaller ones. First, we show for the first time empirically that the AMT affects 
state spending and that this effect is countercyclical. Second, we add to a 
minute legal literature exploring stabilization policy at the state level and con-
sider the impact state policy has on the cycles of national economic health.5 
 
 1. See Yilin Hou, Fiscal Reserves and State Own-Source Expenditure in Downturn 
Years, 33 PUB. FIN. REV. 117, 123 (2005); David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2609-10 (2005). For a recent empirical demonstration of this point, 
see Jonathan Rodden & Erik Wibbels, Fiscal Decentralization and the Business Cycle: An 
Empirical Study of Seven Federations, 22 ECON. & POL. 37 (2010). 
 2. See, e.g., Michael Cooper, States Face Tough Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 
2009, at A17; State Budgets in Crisis: Happy New Year, ECONOMIST, July 4, 2009, at 74; 
Editorial, States in Distress, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2009, at A22. 
 3. Surprisingly, study of the management of the business cycle, known as macroeco-
nomic policy, is almost wholly absent from the legal tax literature. Jeff Strnad’s essay dis-
cusses the general macroeconomic implications of the tax code. See Jeff Strnad, Some Ma-
croeconomic Interactions with Tax Base Choice, 56 SMU L. REV. 171, 181-99 (2003). Lily 
Batchelder and her colleagues have analyzed the macroeconomic and other properties of re-
fundable tax credits, but found macroeconomic considerations relatively unimportant. See 
Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Cre-
dits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 61-65 (2006). David Super considers state stabilization efforts as a 
part of his larger analysis of fiscal ties between the federal government and the states. See 
Super, supra note 1, at 2610-14. And, in an important recent manuscript, Yair Listokin sets 
out more comprehensively the significance of federal tax policy for national business cycles. 
See Yair Listokin, Tax Expenditures and Business Cycle Fluctuations (Yale Law Sch. John 
M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Econ., & Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 378, 2009), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1372782. 
 4. 26 U.S.C. §§ 55-58 (2006). For an overview of the AMT’s complex provisions, 
see STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-38-07, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND 
RELATING TO THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX 1-6 (2007), available at http://www.jct.gov/ 
x-38-07.pdf. 
 5. Our only direct antecedent here is Super, supra note 1, at 2610-14, 2632-37. David 
Gamage also nicely captures many aspects of states’ problems when facing economic hard-
ship, and our analysis follows but expands on his. See David Gamage, Preventing State 
Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 749 (2010).  
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And, third, we attempt to remedy the neglect, in the legal literature and else-
where, of how to design a federal policy that would mitigate the negative busi-
ness cycle effects of state budgeting.6  
Turning to the substance of our argument, the standard goal of macroeco-
nomic policy in general is to be “countercyclical,” stabilizing the economy by 
moderating both booms and busts.7 Extremes in either direction can lead to 
unwanted effects, whether they be job loss or excessive inflation.8 During 
downturns, this means that government may have a role to play in stimulating 
the economy, such as through increased spending, tax cuts, or expansionary 
monetary policy.9 Traditional microeconomic theory also offers similar pre-
scriptions, counseling that transfers of wealth from richer periods (booms) to 
poorer periods (busts) increase overall social welfare.10 
States are in a difficult bind when it comes to stabilization policy, however. 
Their revenues are tied to the business cycle, so that budgets get tighter just 
when the need for countercyclical spending increases.11 Raising taxes to make 
ends meet is contrary to the usual macroeconomic recommendations and is es-
pecially difficult in a modern climate where tax increases drive away produc-
tive citizens and businesses. Whereas Congress can largely avoid this dilemma 
simply by borrowing, states risk driving out citizens with excessive debt, and 
nearly all state legislatures face legal constraints to maintain a balanced budget. 
Those legal constraints, moreover, are sensible responses to the incentives of 
legislatures in prosperous times, which would otherwise likely take on exces-
sive debts.12  
 
 6. Again, the only other effort we are aware of is a brief passage in Super, supra note 
1, at 2650-51, and an unpublished essay by the economist Marianne Vigneault, who studied 
the stabilization properties of alternative possible versions of Canada’s revenue-sharing sys-
tem. See Marianne Vigneault, The Role of Intergovernmental Transfers in Regional Stabili-
zation and Equalization 10-15 (Feb. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.aucc.ca/pdf/english/programs/cepra/Final%20Paper%20-%20Literature%20   
Reviw%20-by%20Vigneault.pdf. Gamage considers a similar but conceptually distinct 
point: how best to distribute the risk of cyclical changes in the tax system across the popula-
tion. See Gamage, supra note 5, at 772-91.  
 7. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 
88-89 (5th ed. 1991). Macroeconomics is the study of whole economies, while microeco-
nomics is the study of individual and group behavior. Id. at 76-77. 
 8. See id. at 88; DAVID ROMER, ADVANCED MACROECONOMICS 217-59 (2d ed. 2001). 
 9. See ROMER, supra note 8, at 494-97.  
 10. We explain this theory in more detail in Part I. 
 11. See Brian Knight & Arik Levinson, Fiscal Institutions in U.S. States, in 
INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS AND FISCAL POLICY 167, 176-80 (Rolf R. Strauch & Jürgen von Ha-
gen eds., 2000); Rodden & Wibbels, supra note 1, at 37; Russell S. Sobel & Randall G. Hol-
combe, The Impact of State Rainy Day Funds in Easing State Fiscal Crises During the 1990-
1991 Recession, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Fall 1996, at 28; David E. Wildasin, State and Lo-
cal Government Finance in the Current Crisis: Time for Emergency Federal Relief? 1 (Inst. 
for Federalism & Intergovernmental Relations, Working Paper No. 2009-07, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.ifigr.org/publication/ifir_working_papers/IFIR-WP-2009-07.pdf.  
 12. We detail the preceding points in Part II. 
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The result is that state finances tend to contribute to, rather than mitigate, 
the pain of economic downturns.13 And in a world where states are so closely 
economically interdependent, these effects are felt well outside any one state’s 
borders.14 As recent events illustrate, state budget crises contribute to national 
economic woes.15 
Accordingly, we argue that the federal government can play some role in 
stabilizing state budgets, leading us to the question of how best to design such 
an intervention. Simply shifting some countercyclical programs, such as unem-
ployment insurance, to the federal budget would be somewhat helpful (albeit at 
some cost to federalism), but would lead to undesirable distortions in state poli-
cymakers’ incentives. Discretionary grants to hard-hit states are unappealing, 
because they may be too slow and targeted more by politics than economic 
needs. On the other extreme, a steady-state subsidy for state revenues—say, 
federal revenue sharing along the lines of the Canadian model—contributes to 
overheating the economy during growth periods, and distorts state budgets up-
ward. The ideal instrument, then, is one that automatically directs federal dol-
lars to a state if and only if its economy is struggling.16  
The federal tax system already contains a set of instruments that approx-
imate this ideal. The tax code grants state taxpayers a deduction for the money 
they pay to their local government—the state and local tax (SALT) deduc-
tion—which, in effect, is a federal matching grant for eligible state levies.17 
The much-reviled AMT, as we will both model and support with original em-
pirical evidence, acts to shut off this matching grant when state economies are 
thriving. In combination, these provisions and others help target federal dollars 
to struggling states. 
In light of the present crisis, we obviously do not claim that this support 
mechanism functions perfectly. Realistically, no stabilization policy could en-
tirely protect states from a recession of this magnitude, but we acknowledge 
several current aspects of the AMT that likely reduce its efficacy. Thus, we also 
suggest several policy tweaks, some at the federal level and some that could 
 
 13. See Hou, supra note 1, at 733 (discussing the procyclicality of state budgeting 
rules); Rodden & Wibbels, supra note 1, at 37; Teressa Ter-Minassian, Decentralization and 
Macroeconomic Management 7 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/97/155, 
1997), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp97155.pdf. 
 14. See Robert P. Inman, Transfers and Bailouts: Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline 
with Lessons from U.S. Federalism, in FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 35, 45-47 (Jonathan Rodden et al. eds., 2003) (discussing the 
extraterritorial effects of local fiscal failures). 
 15. See Wildasin, supra note 11, at 12. Past events demonstrate this relationship as 
well. See Tamim Bayoumi & Barry Eichengreen, Restraining Yourself: The Implications of 
Fiscal Rules for Economic Stabilization, 42 IMF STAFF PAPERS 32, 46 (1995) (“[S]tate 
budgets played a significant role in macroeconomic stabilization in the 1970s and 
1980s . . . .”). 
 16. We explain these arguments in depth in Part III. 
 17. 26 U.S.C. § 164 (2006). 
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simply be adopted by states, that would make better use of the support offered 
by the tax code.  
Overall, we find that the literature’s neglect of stabilization policy has been 
unfortunate, because it has led to the entrenchment of several pieces of conven-
tional wisdom we think need reconsideration. Perhaps most prominent is the 
canard that states should not raise taxes during downturns, repeated recently 
during California’s 2009 budget crisis.18 In fact, taking into account federal 
matching grants, raising tax rates can actually, on net, increase a state’s wealth. 
At the same time, we show that the most effective political structure for tax in-
creases may be to tax the middle class.  
Part I of the Article offers more background on the rationale for govern-
ment interventions in the business cycle. Part II explains why states cannot 
themselves establish effective countercyclical taxing and spending policies. 
Part III elaborates on why standard forms of federal subsidy also are suspect. 
Part IV models the potential power of the AMT to serve as a countercyclical 
federal subsidy and sets out some empirical support for our basic assumption 
that AMT liability at the jurisdictional level rises with state income. Part V 
presents the results of our empirical investigation into the stabilizing effects of 
the AMT. Part VI suggests some policies to improve the AMT’s countercyclic-
al effects. We then conclude. 
I. MICRO-FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMT’S STABILIZATION EFFECT 
The primary arguments for countercyclical fiscal policy can be broadly 
characterized as social insurance arguments and macroeconomic stimulus ar-
guments. Although our general idea can apply in both domains, we will focus 
exclusively on the social insurance aspects of countercyclical fiscal policy.19 
 
 18. See, e.g., Jim Sanders, California Legislature: 1 Month to Battle over Slew of Bills, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 16, 2009, at A1. In earlier recessions, governors pushed for needed 
tax increases, only to be punished by their electorates. See Super, supra note 1, at 2613 
n.267. 
 19. There is significant disagreement among macroeconomists about the efficacy of 
using fiscal policy to stimulate economic growth. Some macroeconomists support the view 
that stimulus is not generally welfare improving. See, e.g., Valerie A. Ramey, Identifying 
Government Spending Shocks: It’s All in the Timing (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 15464, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15464 (placing the 
government spending multiplier, the ratio of resulting consumption per dollar of government 
spending, somewhere between 0.6 and 1.1). Some macroeconomists also claim that fiscal 
policy is effective but inferior to using monetary policy to stimulate the economy and im-
prove welfare. E.g., Christina Romer, Changes in Business Cycles: Evidence and Explana-
tions, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1999, at 23, 36. Other macroeconomists claim that fiscal poli-
cy is the only feasible option to stimulate an economy and improve welfare in a liquidity trap 
where monetary policy is impotent. See, e.g., Lawrence Christiano et al., When Is the Gov-
ernment Spending Multiplier Large? 1-2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 15394, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15394.pdf. Even within the last 
camp, there is disagreement as to whether spending increases or tax cuts are more effective 
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The value of social insurance, or any insurance for that matter, hinges on 
the notion that individuals experience diminishing marginal utility of income. 
That is, as an individual consumes additional units of a good, each increment of 
the good contributes less to the individual’s utility than the previous one did.20 
An immediate consequence of this diminishing marginal utility of income is 
that individuals can improve their welfare by foregoing small amounts of in-
come during good times (by paying an insurance premium) with the expecta-
tion that they will receive a relatively large transfer during bad times (when the 
event that was insured against occurs).21  
In the social insurance context, the government body taxes individuals in 
relatively good financial condition to provide transfers to individuals who have 
suffered some economic loss.22 These transfers are often referred to as fiscal 
“smoothing,” because they level out the peaks and valleys of lifetime earn-
ings.23 Social insurance programs may prove to be superior to privately pro-
vided insurance if they allow for larger pools in which to diversify the underly-
ing risk, or if there is adverse selection due to information asymmetries about 
the underlying risk each person faces.24 As a descriptive matter, social insur-
 
as stimulus tools. Compare Gauti B. Eggertsson, What Fiscal Policy Is Effective at Zero In-
terest Rates? 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 402, 2009), available at 
http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staff_reports/sr402.pdf (concluding that cuts in labor/payroll 
taxes lead to deflationary pressures, which worsen economic conditions), with Mark Bils & 
Pete Klenow, Further Discussion of Temporary Payroll Tax Cut During Recession(s) 4 (Dec. 
12, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://klenow.com/Discussion_of_Payroll_ 
Tax_Cut.pdf (reporting that under their model there are very large gains from cutting payroll 
taxes). To avoid these very complicated debates, we focus on the social insurance aspects of 
countercyclical fiscal policy, and we simply note that the AMT’s stabilization effects could 
be important in models that allow for fiscal policy to have a stimulus effect.  
Even for those readers more interested in macroeconomics per se, our discussion should 
still be pertinent; since recipients of social insurance may have a higher marginal propensity 
to consume, they may be important targets of fiscal stimulus. See Strnad, supra note 3, 
at 195.  
 20. Sometimes referred to as the “law of diminishing marginal utility,” this phenome-
non can be modeled using a concave utility function, which is the standard modeling as-
sumption in economics. See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 185 
(1995). The assumption that marginal utility is diminishing across the entire population is 
probably not completely accurate, but it is greatly simplifying. See Joseph Bankman & 
Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxa-
tion, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1905, 1947 (1987); Richard A. Musgrave, ET, OT, and SBT, 6 J. 
PUB. ECON. 3, 8-9, 14 (1976).  
 21. See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 20, at 187-88. 
 22. It will be useful to distinguish between social insurance and redistribution. Social 
insurance is aimed at mitigating temporary downturns in an individual’s income, whereas 
redistribution attempts to level the amount of lifetime resources the individual has access to. 
See Martin Feldstein, Rethinking Social Insurance, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 2-3 (2005). How-
ever, at a general level, redistribution can be seen as a form of social insurance. See id. at 2. 
 23. See, e.g., James M. Poterba & Jürgen von Hagen, Introduction to FISCAL 
INSTITUTIONS AND FISCAL PERFORMANCE 1, 5 (James M. Poterba & Jürgen von Hagen eds., 
1999). 
 24. See Feldstein, supra note 22, at 4. Note that social insurance necessarily generates 
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ance is generally provided with respect to income losses resulting from invo-
luntary unemployment25 or more general problems leading to poverty26 to the 
near exclusion of private insurance. Social insurance programs generally tar-
geted at the chronically poor or elderly populations also exist in the health in-
surance market alongside private competitors.27 More limited social insurance 
programs include food stamps and subsidized housing.28 
While fiscal smoothing would be especially desirable during downturns, 
politics may frustrate that preference. Individuals may unanimously “agree” to 
these social insurance programs in some idealized state, behind what Buchanan 
and Tullock call a state of uncertainty29 or what Rawls dubs the veil of ignor-
ance30 wherein an individual does not know what characteristics or preferences 
with which she will later be endowed. However, once they find themselves in a 
position where they pay more into these programs than they expect to receive, 
support may decline. Worse yet, this decrease in support may coincide with in-
stances when the need for the social insurance is greatest, such as times of eco-
nomic contraction. Absent some strong institutional commitments, politicians 
may be hesitant to collect taxes from individuals who are relatively well-off to 
help the less well-off, especially if the former are more likely to vote than the 
latter.31 Perversely, when the economic condition is at its best, people may be 
most willing to pay taxes to pay for social insurance. Technically speaking, so-
cial insurance (like public goods more generally) is a normal good, implying 
that the willingness to pay for it increases with income.32 
If government institutions—in our case, state and local government institu-
tions—were disciplined enough to save in the good times and spend in the bad 
 
cross-subsidization in this context, though under a Rawlsian veil of ignorance individuals 
may support such cross-subsidies. 
 25. Beyond private insurance markets, there is evidence that public provision of un-
employment insurance crowds out precautionary savings and additional income production 
in the family. See Julie Berry Cullen & Jonathan Gruber, Does Unemployment Insurance 
Crowd Out Spousal Labor Supply?, 18 J. LAB. ECON. 546 (2000); Eric M. Engen & Jonathan 
Gruber, Unemployment Insurance and Precautionary Saving, 47 J. MONETARY ECON. 545 
(2001). 
 26. See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber & Daniel M. Hungerman, Faith-Based Charity and 
Crowd-Out During the Great Depression, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 1043, 1043 (2007). 
 27. Although there is evidence of crowd-out here as well. See David M. Cutler & Jo-
nathan Gruber, Does Public Insurance Crowd Out Private Insurance?, 111 Q.J. ECON. 391 
(1996). 
 28. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2036 (2006) (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program); 
HOME and Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC), U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV. 
(June 2, 2010), http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/training/web/lihtc.  
 29. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 78 (1965). 
 30. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136 (1971). 
 31. A number of studies find this effect. See, e.g., Richard J. Timpone, Structure, Be-
havior, and Voter Turnout in the United States, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 145, 149 (1998). 
 32. See, e.g., Daniel Hewitt, Demand for National Public Goods: Estimates from Sur-
veys, 23 ECON. INQUIRY 487, 503 (1985). 
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times, they could engage in fiscal smoothing. Advocates of smoothing have 
championed rainy day funds on these grounds, but those efforts have been 
largely ineffective because relatively few have strong deposit and withdrawal 
rules.33 Given the lack of binding institutional commitments and short time ho-
rizons on the part of politicians, the more common pattern is for state and local 
governments to spend more during good times and less during bad times.34 
In the following Parts, we analyze in more detail the causes of the failure 
of states to provide anywhere near optimal amounts of fiscal smoothing and 
evaluate several possible solutions to this problem.  
II. WEAKNESS OF STATE STABILIZATION TOOLS 
In this Part we explore the many failures of state financing in times of eco-
nomic trouble. State governments have a large influence, for good or ill, on 
public efforts to smooth incomes over time.35 But, as we have noted, studies 
have also shown that state spending tends to fall just at those times it would be 
most needed.36 There are no viable state-level solutions to this problem. States 
might make up for revenue shortfalls by raising taxes, borrowing, or drawing 
from existing savings. As we argue in the ensuing Subparts, however, these op-
tions are normatively unattractive, descriptively unlikely as a political matter, 
or both.  
A. Tax Rate Increases 
One obvious cure for declines in state tax revenues is for the state to in-
crease tax rates to make up for the shortfall.37 For several reasons, it is likely 
that tax increases, in the absence of any federal subsidy, will be on net a bad 
move economically for the state and politically for the state’s officials. 
First, tax rates should be kept smooth over time in order to minimize wel-
fare losses. In brief, the size of the welfare loss from a tax increases exponen-
tially as the tax rate goes up, so that a tax of 0% one year and 20% the next is 
 
 33. Sobel & Holcombe, supra note 11, at 44; Gary A. Wagner & Russell S. Sobel, 
State Budget Stabilization Fund Adoption: Preparing for the Next Recession or Circumvent-
ing Fiscal Restraints?, 126 PUB. CHOICE 177, 180-85 (2006). 
 34. Rodden & Wibbels, supra note 1, at 56 (“Procyclicality is the rule among provinc-
es and states in federations.”). 
 35. Bayoumi & Eichengreen, supra note 15, at 46; Edward M. Gramlich, Subnational 
Fiscal Policy, in PERSPECTIVES ON LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 3, 4-5 (John 
M. Quigley ed., 1987); Arik Levinson, Balanced Budgets and Business Cycles: Evidence 
from the States, 51 NAT’L TAX J. 715, 716 (1998); Rodden & Wibbels, supra note 1, at 42-
43 (noting that federal efforts to smooth incomes can be “completely undone by the need for 
provincial governments to raise taxes or cut expenditures because of flagging revenues”). 
 36. See sources cited supra note 13.  
 37. Of course, this would only be an attractive strategy if the stimulative effect of the 
state’s spending were greater than the drag on the economy caused by the tax.  
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much worse than a steady tax of 10% each year.38 If revenue needs increase 
unexpectedly, the state should borrow, which allows it to spread the cost of 
meeting those needs more evenly over time.39 
States are also constrained in their ability to raise taxes for income smooth-
ing by the possibility that individuals and businesses may exit the state in re-
sponse to tax rate increases. Residents who do not receive social insurance 
payments may perceive transfers as losses.40 Because of free riding, this dis-
content might not significantly affect voting behavior.41 With exit, by contrast, 
it is difficult for one resident to free ride on another’s effort to oppose undesir-
able policy; a neighbor’s exit does little to preserve the value of one’s own 
home.42 Thus, exit is not subject to the same degree of collective action prob-
lems as voting, so that mobile residents unhappy with social insurance pay-
ments may well flee the state.43 States may be able to extract redistributive tax-
 
 38. The normative appeal of rate smoothing derives from the way taxes distort eco-
nomic behavior. When taxes rise, some productive exchanges do not occur: the equilibrium 
point shifts to the left on a standard supply/demand curve, leaving a triangular area 
representing lost welfare gains. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC 
FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 235-36, 279-95 (5th ed. 1989). The welfare losses that 
result can be calculated by the standard geometric formula for the area of a triangle, (1/2)bh, 
implying that the loss rises in proportion to the square of the size of the distortion. Id. at 281. 
 39. See Robert J. Barro, On the Determination of the Public Debt, 87 J. POL. ECON. 
940, 943-45 (1979). For instance, instead of hiking rates from 10% to 20% for one year, it 
might instead borrow, and increase rates to 11% for ten years to pay off the debt. Again, be-
cause of the exponential relationship between tax rates and welfare losses, this move would 
increase the overall welfare of the state. 
 40. See Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Shar-
ing and Redistribution, 104 J. POL. ECON. 979, 988 (1996) (assuming that individuals who 
are less exposed to risk will prefer lower amounts of social insurance); Rodden & Wibbels, 
supra note 1, at 42 (arguing that an automatic interpersonal social insurance program would 
disproportionally favor individuals affected by regional shocks). 
 41. See, e.g., Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, The Apparent Ideological Behavior of 
Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions, 33 J.L. & ECON. 103, 
103-04, 107-08 (1990). Some scholars argue that political conditions in select local govern-
ments mitigate this problem. For instance, suburban homeowners in a given jurisdiction may 
all have relatively similar preferences for the few services their government provides, and 
their social and geographic proximity may encourage collective action. See WILLIAM A. 
FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 73-76 (2001). But this is not true of more diverse ju-
risdictions, such as states, rural counties, suburbs that welcome many new migrants, or large 
cities. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. 
L. REV. 346, 400-22 (1990). Even within suburbs, residents may overcome free riding only 
on issues of special importance to a subset of the whole population, making monitoring ha-
phazard and contingent on the alignment of monitor interests with government performance 
on that narrow issue. Cf. Jean Tirole, The Internal Organization of Government, 46 OXFORD 
ECON. PAPERS 1, 3-4 (1994) (describing the difficulties of monitoring an entity that performs 
variety of services and may succeed at some and fail at others). 
 42. See Clayton P. Gillette, Can Public Debt Enhance Democracy?, 50 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 937, 965-66 (2008). 
 43. See id. It is well established empirically that taxes affect the location of capital in-
vestment. E.g., Michael P. Devereux & Rachel Griffith, Taxes and the Location of Produc-
tion: Evidence from a Panel of US Multinationals, 68 J. PUB. ECON. 335, 335, 351-58 
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es up to the exit costs of each taxpayer,44 but in many cases, states have already 
made binding commitments to mobile taxpayers not to exact the full exit cost, 
and those commitments by definition are costly to escape.45 The federal gov-
ernment generally does not face these problems, because the costs of exiting 
the United States are typically prohibitively high.46 
The exit option also compounds the familiar difficulty of overcoming resis-
tance to taxation by those who do not presently need social insurance payouts. 
At the state level, as at the national level, there will be conflict among special 
 
(1998); Joseph M. Phillips & Ernest P. Goss, The Effect of State and Local Taxes on Eco-
nomic Development: A Meta-Analysis, 62 S. ECON. J. 320, 320, 323-29 (1995). Evidence that 
taxes also affect personal choices is less overwhelming, but still substantial. E.g., Richard J. 
Cebula, Internal Migration Determinants: Recent Evidence, 11 INT’L ADVANCES ECON. RES. 
267, 272 (2005) (reporting that the cost of living affects migration patterns); Peter John et 
al., Residential Mobility in London: A Micro-Level Test of the Behavioural Assumptions of 
the Tiebout Model, 25 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 379, 379 (1995) (“Taxes and services are found to 
be important factors in the moving decision . . . .”); Hui Shan, Property Taxes and Elderly 
Mobility, 67 J. URB. ECON. 194 (2010) (finding that rising property taxes cause older house-
holds to relocate); Donald Bruce et al., Base Mobility and State Personal Income Taxes 18 
(Sept. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://cber.utk.edu/confpapers/Bruc_ 
Fox_Yang.pdf (“[T]axpayers with pension income prefer lower-tax-rate states . . . .”); Elda 
Pema, Do State Taxes Affect the Migration of Human Capital? (unpublished manuscript), 
available at https://www.msu.edu/~pemaelda/E_Pema-Taxes%20and%20Human%20Capital 
.pdf (finding that more educated households are also more responsive to local taxes, affect-
ing migration rates). 
 44. See Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances, and Judi-
cial Intervention, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1057, 1082-84 (2007); Saul Levmore, Interstate Ex-
ploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563, 571-72, 601 (1983). Note that this 
implies that states with larger locational surplus—generally more densely populated and 
more urban jurisdictions—will be more capable of stabilization spending.  
 45. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 
1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 235-36 (1985). 
 46. In theory states could overcome the exit problem by coordinated action, but both 
theory and observation suggest that will be rare. If all states face equal need for stabilization 
spending, and all raise taxes together, the exit dilemma disappears, because no state is more 
or less of a bargain than it was before the crisis, all else being equal. That is an extreme and 
implausible scenario, but it may retain a significant grain of truth regionally. See Ravi Kan-
bur & Michael Keen, Jeux Sans Frontières: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When 
Countries Differ in Size, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 877, 879-81 (1993). If neighboring states are 
affected in relatively similar fashion, and relocating out of the affected region is expensive, 
then only clusters of states need act together, rather than all fifty at once. 
Still, most scholars believe that coordinated tax raising will be rare, because the benefits 
of defection are high. This dynamic produces a prisoner’s dilemma in which states must cut 
taxes to attract mobile taxpayers, even if that strategy loses revenues. See Dan T. Coenen, 
Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965, 1025-26 (1998); 
Kelly Edmiston, Strategic Apportionment of the State Corporate Income Tax: An Applied 
General Equilibrium Analysis, 55 NAT’L TAX J. 239, 251 (2002). These theories have some 
empirical support. Robert C. Turner & Mark Cassell, Racing to the Bottom at Different 
Speeds? The Impact of Intra-State Competition on Abatement Generosity in Ohio (2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.skidmore.edu/~bturner/Racing%20to% 
20the%20Bottom%20at%20Different%20Speeds%20Turner%20and%20Cassell.pdf. There 
is no obvious reason the situation would be different for stabilization spending.  
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interest groups over the taxing/spending tradeoff. Beneficiaries of stabilizing 
transfer payments can form a coherent group to defend and expand their en-
titlement, just as the small group of wealthy taxpayers may overcome free-rider 
dynamics to lobby against rate hikes.47 What changes at the local level is that 
mobile taxpayers have the additional lever of the threat of their departure. Exit 
would not only deprive the official of revenue for her own goals, but also jeo-
pardize her reelection by sending a potential negative signal to the remaining 
citizens about the quality of her performance.48 Thus, taxpayers who can make 
at least a credible exit threat will likely be disproportionately powerful in resist-
ing local tax increases.49 Again, there are many more of those taxpayers at the 
local level than at the national level. 
B. Borrowing 
An obvious alternative to tax hikes for revenue-starved states is borrowing. 
Public borrowing can take a variety of forms, ranging from a straightforward 
bank loan to the sale of bonds of various kinds.50 Borrowing, too, however, 
may be both normatively undesirable and practically difficult.  
1. Exit pressures on local borrowing 
On the practical side, just as the possibility of exit constrains state tax le-
vels, so too does it limit states’ opportunity to borrow.51 Indeed, under some 
conditions there is no difference between taxes and debt. After all, debts are 
simply promises to pay, which must be financed with future taxes. For a local 
resident who is fully aware of the extent of the public debt, expects to be 
 
 47. See Barry R. Weingast et al., The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A 
Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics, 89 J. POL. ECON. 642, 648 (1981) (arguing 
that legislators award pecuniary gains to discrete individuals and groups in order to “claim 
credit and exact tribute”). 
 48. See GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 178 (1980). 
 49. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdic-
tional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 
264-65 (1997); Gillette, supra note 42, at 966; see also Emmanuelle Reulier & Yvon Roca-
boy, Regional Tax Competition: Evidence from French Regions, 43 REGIONAL STUD. 915 
(2009) (finding that the main source of pressure on individual income tax rates in competing 
localities is the ability of individuals to compare their own rates against those of their neigh-
bors’ and threaten to punish underperforming officials). 
 50. For an overview of the dynamics of public borrowing, see William W. Bratton & 
G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 
1, 8-25 (2004). 
 51. For empirical evidence that states face difficulty borrowing, see Douglas Holtz-
Eakin et al., Intertemporal Analysis of State and Local Government Spending: Theory and 
Tests, 35 J. URB. ECON. 159 (1994); and Wildasin, supra note 11, at 13 (summarizing other 
studies). 
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around for the term of the repayment, and has a personal discount rate that 
matches the market rate of interest, these future promises to pay should be per-
fectly equivalent to a current tax obligation.52 This principle is known to econ-
omists as “Ricardian equivalence.”53 Assuming, then, that Ricardian equiva-
lence holds, states cannot mitigate exit pressure by financing their expenditures 
through debt rather than current tax increases.  
On the other hand, both theory and evidence suggest that perfect Ricardian 
equivalence is rare.54 Taxpayers may rationally conclude that they will die or 
move before current debts are fully paid. If the local economy recovers and 
then expands, the taxpayers may be wealthier in the future, making the future 
payment of tax less painful than it is now when the taxpayers are relatively 
poorer. The taxpayers may have a higher discount rate than the market rate of 
interest, so that they value current expenditures more than the discounted 
present value of the future stream of interest payments. The state government 
might repudiate its debts, or be bailed out by the federal government. And im-
perfectly informed taxpayers may not even be aware that the burden of debt 
service will be equivalent to a current tax increase. Notwithstanding this intui-
tive critique, empirical studies of whether equivalence exists produce widely 
divergent results.55  
Even if Ricardian equivalence is incomplete, future debt can still lead to 
high exit pressure due to its effect on housing prices.56 Because the price of a 
home reflects the net value of living in it, future tax obligations should depress 
home values by their proportionate discounted present value, a process known 
as “capitalization.”57 As a result of capitalization, a state’s future loan obliga-
tions reduce the present wealth of its residents, even those who would other-
 
 52. See Robert J. Barro, Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?, 82 J. POL. ECON. 1095, 
1096 (1974). 
 53. ROMER, supra note 8, at 537; John J. Seater, Ricardian Equivalence, 31 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 142, 142 (1993). 
 54. For discussion of the points in this paragraph, see ROMER, supra note 8, at 537-41; 
Tamim Bayoumi & Paul R. Masson, Liability-Creating Versus Non-Liability-Creating Fis-
cal Stabilisation Policies: Ricardian Equivalence, Fiscal Stablisation, and EMU, 108 ECON. 
J. 1026, 1028 (1998); Robert P. Inman, Public Debts and Fiscal Politics: How to Decide?, 
80 AM. ECON. REV. 81, 84 (1990); and Seater, supra note 53, at 144-56. 
 55. For example, one comprehensive survey claims that equivalence is a close approx-
imation of reality, see Seater, supra note 53, at 156-84 (reviewing dozens of studies), while 
another survey claims to find “strong evidence against” equivalence, T.D. Stanley, New 
Wine in Old Bottles: A Meta-Analysis of Ricardian Equivalence, 64 S. ECON. J. 713, 713-14 
(1998). 
 56. See Clayton P. Gillette, Direct Democracy and Debt, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 365, 391 (2004); Inman, supra note 54, at 83. 
 57. See Gillette, supra note 56, at 391; Inman, supra note 54, at 83. For instance, if my 
ten-unit condo association borrows $100,000 to replace the roof of my building at a market 
rate of interest, the loan will reduce the resale price of each unit by about $10,000.  
Empirical evidence suggests that capitalization is usually incomplete, however. See Gil-
lette, supra note 56, at 392 (summarizing studies). 
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wise have heavily discounted the burden of that debt.58 Knowing this, residents 
might flee or threaten to flee a jurisdiction that was considering taking on new 
debt.59 And, real estate aside, Ricardian equivalence need not be complete for 
current voters to have at least some qualms about the prospect of higher future 
tax bills. 
2. Political economy of local debt 
Even if Ricardian equivalence and capitalization are both incomplete, the 
very factors that permit a state to borrow during downturns also may make bor-
rowing at the state level normatively unattractive. Distortions in the political 
process may result in excess borrowing during both bad times and good. On 
net, the cost of these distortions may well outweigh any benefits that would ac-
crue from unconstrained debt-financed stimulus. In theory, what is needed is a 
mechanism to ease borrowing in lean times and constrain it at others. As we 
will sketch shortly, however, it is difficult to design effective legal or institu-
tional limits on state borrowing, let alone limits fine-tuned enough to be turned 
on or off at the right times.  
One well-known set of reasons for excess borrowing is tied to the incentive 
structure of rational voters to favor the present over the future. Again, it is ra-
tional for some voters to conclude that they will not ultimately be obliged to 
pay off all of the debt their jurisdiction incurs. Any given voter might die or 
move before the balance comes fully due.60 If capitalization is incomplete, even 
homeowners can escape the jurisdiction without bearing the costs of the gov-
ernment’s debts, and renters (or those who live free in someone else’s home, 
such as voting-age children) can likely escape it in any event.61 Thus, there is 
an intertemporal fiscal externality, in which present voters do not fully take into 
account the costs of borrowing on succeeding residents.62 Similarly, voters may 
expect that if future debt payments become too onerous, their government 
might simply repudiate or default on its debts.63 Repudiation would damage the 
jurisdiction’s credit rating, raising the costs of subsequent borrowing, but these 
costs again would be felt relatively far into the future.64 
 
 58. See Inman, supra note 54, at 83. 
 59. See Gillette, supra note 56, at 392; Inman, supra note 54, at 83-84. 
 60. See Bayoumi & Masson, supra note 54, at 1028; Inman, supra note 54, at 84 n.4. 
 61. See Gillette, supra note 42, at 959-60; Inman, supra note 54, at 84 n.4. We claim 
that renters do not bear the burden of future debt on the assumption that there is a relation-
ship between property values and rents. Over the long term, when housing costs rise, so do 
rents. Joshua Gallin, The Long-Run Relationship Between House Prices and Rents, 36 REAL 
EST. ECON. 635, 636 (2008). So lower home values should result in lower rents, which 
means that public debt actually benefits renters.  
 62. See Gillette, supra note 42, at 961; Inman, supra note 54, at 84. 
 63. See Gillette, supra note 42, at 971. 
 64. Id. 
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In addition to the intertemporal externality, state borrowing also involves 
some interjurisdictional externalities. Default by one state can increase credit 
costs for other similar or neighboring states.65 Accordingly, each individual 
state may take on more debt, and correspondingly more default risk, than would 
an optimizing social planner. Similarly, states are probably “too big to fail.”66 
The prospect of a state outright defaulting on its debts would be relatively dis-
astrous for residents, neighbors, creditors, and even other counterparties of the 
creditors.67 Thus, most analysts assume that central governments implicitly 
guarantee the debts of their local governments.68 This guarantee leads to moral 
hazard—the costs of risky debt are shifted from the state to the central govern-
ment, with the result that the state takes on more debt than it would if it bore all 
the likely costs.69  
Many commentators also believe that, in addition to these rational reasons 
for citizens to agree to too much debt, there are also irrational factors that con-
tribute to excess public indebtedness.70 Econometric studies so far can neither 
confirm nor refute the hypothesis that borrowing increases the size of govern-
ment.71 A number of studies have shown, though, that personal borrowing pat-
terns are consistent with a story in which individuals incur greater borrowing 
 
 65. See Gillette, supra note 56, at 976-77; Ehtisham Ahmad et al., Subnational Public 
Financial Management: Institutions and Macroeconomic Considerations 13 (Int’l Monetary 
Fund, Working Paper No. 05/108, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=887977. 
 66. See David E. Wildasin, Externalities and Bailouts: Hard and Soft Budget Con-
straints in Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 1, 20-22 (World Bank Dev. Research Grp., 
Working Paper No. 1843, 1997), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/ 
1843.html (modeling the argument that larger subnational governments are more likely to 
receive bailouts). 
 67. Cf. Inman, supra note 14, at 45-53 (describing the intergovernmental impacts of 
defaults). 
 68. See, e.g., Wallace E. Oates, On the Theory and Practice of Fiscal Decentraliza-
tion, in INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC FINANCE: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVES 165, 176 (Alan J. Auerbach & Daniel N. Shaviro eds., 2008); Jonathan Rod-
den, The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grants and Fiscal Performance Around the World, 
46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 670, 671-72 (2002); Andres Velasco, Debts and Deficits with Frag-
mented Fiscal Policymaking, 76 J. PUB. ECON. 105, 107 (2000). Robert Inman argues, 
though, that the United States has generally resisted bailouts, although he acknowledges 
some prominent recent exceptions. Inman, supra note 14, at 59-61. 
 69. See Rodden, supra note 68, at 671-72; Velasco, supra note 68, at 107; Ahmad et 
al., supra note 65, at 12-13.  
 70. See, e.g., BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 48, at 24-32, 40; Susanne Lohmann 
& Deborah M. Weiss, Hidden Taxes and Representative Government: The Political Econo-
my of the Ramsey Rule, 30 PUB. FIN. REV. 579, 584-86, 605 (2002) (suggesting that taxation 
and budgeting may be driven by political manipulation of ignorant voters). 
 71. See Brian E. Dollery & Andrew C. Worthington, The Empirical Analysis of Fiscal 
Illusion, 10 J. ECON. SURVS. 261, 293-94 (1996); Wallace E. Oates, On the Nature and Mea-
surement of Fiscal Illusion: A Survey, in TAXATION AND FISCAL FEDERALISM: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF RUSSELL MATHEWS 65, 76-77 (Geoffrey Brennan et al. eds., 1988). 
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costs in the present than they would prefer later.72 Since your authors disagree 
on the policy implications of putatively irrational behavior,73 we will proceed 
here on the assumption that voters are rational. 
Whatever the ultimate behavior of individual voters, there are also familiar 
incentives for public officials to increase debt above the optimal level. All offi-
cials have a limited time horizon in office. If the official wants to win reelec-
tion to extend that time, or ring up “rents” from interest groups while she holds 
power, then the value to her of enacting programs now will be much greater 
than the cost of paying for those programs after she is out of office.74 Besley 
and Case, for example, find that officials in their last term of a term-limited of-
fice spend more than at other times—suggesting that when officials know they 
will not serve much longer, they are less attentive to the future costs of their 
decisions.75  
While federal officials also face these kinds of pressures, the dynamic is 
especially acute at the state and local level. Each jurisdiction faces competitive 
pressure to deliver services now at a better price than its competitors. In another 
Besley and Case study, for instance, the authors find that voters appear to eva-
luate their officials’ performance in part by comparing their own tax burden to 
 
 72. See Sumit Agarwal et al., The Age of Reason: Financial Decisions over the Life 
Cycle and Implications for Regulation, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2009, at 
51, 53 (reporting that younger and older individuals pay interest rates that “are not explained 
by differences in observed risk characteristics”); Paul S. Calem & Loretta J. Mester, Con-
sumer Behavior and the Stickiness of Credit-Card Interest Rates, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1327, 
1327-28, 1333 (1995) (finding evidence that consumers are impatient or misestimate their 
future borrowing behavior, leading to excessive present costs); David Laibson et al., A Debt 
Puzzle, in KNOWLEDGE, INFORMATION, AND EXPECTATIONS IN MODERN MACROECONOMICS: 
IN HONOR OF EDMUND S. PHELPS 228, 228-29 (Philippe Aghion et al. eds., 2003). 
 73. Compare Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irration-
ality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1626 (2006) (suggesting that 
government correction of consumer errors may lower welfare in the long run by reducing 
incentives for consumers to change themselves), with Brian Galle, Federal Fairness to State 
Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded Mandates, and the “SALT” Deduction, 106 MICH. L. 
REV. 805, 818-23 (2008) (arguing that Klick and Mitchell assume that consumers would 
have the power to change their own behavior without government intervention).  
 74. See Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits 
and State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 917-18 (2003); Clayton Gillette, Fiscal 
Federalism and the Use of Municipal Bond Proceeds, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1030, 1062-63 
(1983); Inman, supra note 54, at 82. 
 75. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence 
from the United States, 41 J. ECON. LITERATURE 7, 54-56 (2003); see also James M. Poterba, 
State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics, 102 J. 
POL. ECON. 799, 818 (1994) (finding that proximity to the next election affected governors’ 
choices of how to balance budget). Creditors are also a potential source of restraint on bor-
rowing, Gillette, supra note 42, at 942, but the goals of creditors rarely match those of con-
stituents, and many creditors have only weak incentives to monitor local governments. See 
id. at 972, 975-81; see also Ter-Minassian, supra note 13, at 10 (arguing that officials are 
insensitive to credit market discipline). 
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those of similar neighbors.76 In a world where there is less than full Ricardian 
equivalence, one way for local officials to compete successfully is to shift the 
tax cost of providing current services into the future. If Ricardian equivalence 
does not hold, voters might deem the official who uses debt to finance govern-
ment to be outperforming the neighboring officials who raise taxes.77 
3. Legal limits on local debt 
Given the political dynamics we have just described, it is unsurprising that 
many states have tied their officials’ hands by sharply limiting their own capac-
ity to take on debt, with important consequences for state stabilization capabili-
ty. Nearly all states have a constitutional or statutory requirement for an annual 
“balanced budget,” although the meaning of that requirement varies widely.78 
Other jurisdictions require supermajority legislative approval of new debt, im-
pose caps on the total amount of new or total borrowing, or require voter ap-
proval of some kinds of debt issues.79 Few if any of these limits contain any 
facial exception for borrowing in times of great need.80 Thus, whatever one’s 
view of the normative desirability of borrowing, it is evident that the threat of 
excessive indebtedness has given rise to a legal system in which states are ap-
parently constrained in their ability to borrow at any time, including times 
when it is urgently needed.81 
As a practical matter, however, few of these limits are as constrictive as 
they appear. State courts routinely allow their governments to sidestep fiscal 
limits.82 For instance, courts have blessed arrangements where a state creates a 
separate “authority,” nominally independent from the state, which then is able 
to borrow without limit and use the revenues for state purposes.83 Similarly, 
 
 76. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, 
and Yardstick Competition, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 25, 28-30 (1995). But see Gillette, supra 
note 42, at 958-59 (arguing that government services are too difficult to compare for inter-
jurisdictional competition to be meaningful). 
 77. See Ahmad et al., supra note 65, at 12. As Inman explains, capitalization likely 
fails to restrain these exit-driven pressures to borrow, since rational home buyers will each 
free ride on one another’s efforts to verify future debt burdens. See Inman, supra note 14, 
at 50-51. 
 78. See Knight & Levinson, supra note 11, at 169-70 tbl.1; Levinson, supra note 35, 
at 717. 
 79. Briffault, supra note 74, at 915-16. 
 80. See James M. Poterba, Budget Institutions and Fiscal Policy in the U.S. States, 86 
AM. ECON. REV. 395, 396 (1996) (listing states’ usual options for mitigating fiscal restraints, 
none of which are related to business cycle); see also Levinson, supra note 35, at 717-19 
(same, and noting that restraints on state budget rules may in fact “exacerbate” the impact of 
business cycles on states). 
 81. See Briffault, supra note 74, at 917-18, 948 (discussing the reasons for state consti-
tutional limits on spending). 
 82. See id. at 909, 918-25. 
 83. Id. at 919-22. 
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bonds secured by a stream of revenue from a particular project, such as a new 
toll road, are usually not counted against state borrowing caps.84  
Nonetheless, empirical evidence suggests that the limits are far from mea-
ningless. In particular, several studies show that states with tighter borrowing 
limits are less effective at stabilizing their economies.85 Further, other evidence 
shows that the end-around mechanisms states use, though effective, are also 
expensive, raising the state’s cost of borrowing.86  
Overall, then, borrowing appears to be at best a highly imperfect solution 
to state fiscal crises. Exit pressures limit state capacity to borrow, and the threat 
of voter indifference and political opportunism has led to legal mechanisms that 
choke off borrowing further. While we might hope that judicial interpretations 
of legal restraints would be less constraining in tough economic times, it is not 
clear that judges will be skilled at recognizing those times, or articulating prin-
cipled legal rules for distinguishing “good” borrowing from bad.  
C. Rainy Day Funds 
Savings serve as a possible crisis-funding alternative to tax increases and 
borrowing.87 States can save simply by carrying a budget surplus from one year 
to another, or alternatively by dedicating money out of current revenues to a 
fund for use only in future fiscal emergencies, sometimes known as “rainy day 
funds.”88 Saving is fiscally equivalent to borrowing, but with the temporal ar-
row reversed.89 In borrowing, the state transfers money from itself during a lat-
er good time to a current bad time; savings moves money from the present good 
 
 84. Id. at 918-19. 
 85. See, e.g., Bayoumi & Eichengreen, supra note 15, at 33, 40-41, 46; see also James 
Poterba, Do Budget Rules Work?, in FISCAL POLICY: LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
53, 75-77 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1997) (collecting studies). But see Robert Krol & Shirley 
Svorny, Budget Rules and State Business Cycles, 35 PUB. FIN. REV. 530, 541 (2007). Krol 
and Svorny reach contrary results by relying on a different definition of what constitutes a 
strict budget constraint. They employ an index devised by Government Accountability Of-
fice (GAO) lawyers, and eschew the state official self-reporting that was the basis for other 
studies. Id. at 532, 534-35. They do not verify the GAO’s work. We find state self-reporting 
more persuasive, because officials will probably know the reality of their own budget con-
straints. Research assistants working at the GAO may easily have read what appears in a sta-
tute to be a strict state rule as strict, when in reality it has been judicially undermined or is 
easily circumvented. 
 86. See Briffault, supra note 74, at 926; James M. Poterba, Balanced Budget Rules and 
Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the States, 48 NAT’L TAX J. 329, 334-35 (1995); see also Po-
terba, supra note 75, at 804-18 (finding that even states with strict budget limits are able to 
adjust to fiscal shocks, but that more binding limits have larger effects on state spending).  
 87. Sobel & Holcombe, supra note 11, at 28. 
 88. Id. at 29-30. 
 89. See Martin Browning & Annamaria Lusardi, Household Saving: Micro Theories 
and Micro Facts, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1797, 1799-812 (1996) (discussing saving and 
borrowing as alternative tools for income smoothing). 
GALLE AND KLICK 63 STAN. L. REV. 187 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2010 12:34 PM 
December 2010] AMT AS A FISCAL STABILIZER 205 
time to the time of some future crisis. Other commentators overwhelmingly en-
dorse rainy day funds as in theory the best solution to state fiscal crises.90  
Unfortunately, many of the dynamics that threaten to cause runaway bor-
rowing also tend to undermine the usefulness of rainy day funds. Data show 
that few states save nearly enough money to protect themselves against later 
downturns.91 The reasons are much the same as those we have already 
sketched. All of the relevant actors, from individual voters to elected officials, 
have strong incentives to prefer current over deferred spending. Any coalition 
that is currently in power in a politically competitive state will be reluctant to 
transfer resources from itself to a subsequent, and potentially competing, coali-
tion.92 And economic stability is a public good, so that we can predict that there 
rarely will be a coherent political constituency in favor of stability for its own 
sake.93 Accordingly, there are powerful political incentives for state officials 
both to save too little and also to withdraw savings from any existing rainy day 
fund well before any true fiscal crisis.  
As a result, there are no effective mechanisms that would allow states to 
provide efficient levels of social insurance. Taxes and borrowing are con-
strained by exit and often are normatively undesirable in any event. And absent 
some set of outside incentives, rainy day funds will likely be a rarity at the state 
level.  
III. FEDERAL INTERVENTIONS 
So far we have shown that income smoothing is an important function of 
government, but that state governments likely cannot provide it efficiently. 
That suggests an important role for the federal government in social insurance. 
However, as we argue in this Part, many problems also bedevil any federal ef-
forts at income smoothing. Direct federal provision of social insurance is con-
trary to many of the tenets of federalism, and would create a moral hazard on 
the part of state policymakers. And matching grants or other fiscal transfers to 
states run the risk of being either too generous, and so distorting state decisions, 
or too slow and bureaucratic to respond to a rapidly changing economy.  
A. Federalize Social Insurance  
If states cannot effectively smooth incomes, the federal government 
 
 90. See, e.g., Sobel & Holcombe, supra note 11, at 28, 30, 43-45; Super, supra note 1, 
at 2642-43. 
 91. See Sobel & Holcombe, supra note 11, at 33; Super, supra note 1, at 2611. 
 92. See Lars P. Feld & Gebhard Kirchgässner, Does Direct Democracy Reduce Public 
Debt? Evidence from Swiss Municipalities, 109 PUB. CHOICE 347, 350 (2001); Super, supra 
note 1, at 2611. 
 93. Cf. Gillette, supra note 42, at 955 (making this point about monitoring the misuse 
of public funds). 
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might.94 There is already an extensive and generally inconclusive literature on 
the role of the federal government in redistributing wealth.95 While centralized 
redistribution mitigates some problems, it also may sacrifice other federalism 
values.96 For example, one set of federal policymakers cannot easily capture all 
social preferences for redistribution; redistribution at the local level allows in-
dividuals to sort themselves according to their preferences.97 Recasting this 
familiar debate in the context of social insurance leads us to two additional ar-
guments. 
First, an underappreciated problem with the federal provision of social in-
surance is that it induces moral hazard at the state policymaking level.98 Feder-
al social insurance reduces the downside risk of policy reform for each state, 
leading to increased risk taking in all policy areas, not only those with federal 
funding.99 Additionally, since federal funding is a common pool, each state has 
incentives to withdraw—that is, to take big risks—before others.100 The inter-
 
 94. See Super, supra note 1, at 2636, 2648-49 (suggesting a larger federal role in so-
cial insurance). 
 95. For an overview, see George R. Zodrow, Reflections on the Economic Theory of 
Local Tax Incentives, 28 ST. TAX NOTES 891, 893-94 (2003). 
 96. See Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Competition and European Union: Contrasting 
Perspectives, 31 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 133, 133-43 (2001) (discussing the benefits 
and drawbacks of a tax system with multiple competing sovereigns rather than a single cen-
tral authority); John Douglas Wilson & David E. Wildasin, Capital Tax Competition: Bane 
or Boon?, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1065, 1088 (2004) (same); George R. Zodrow, Tax Competition 
and Tax Coordination in the European Union, 10 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 651, 651-66 (2003) 
(same). 
 97. See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 38, at 451; Mariano Tommasi & Frede-
rico Weinschelbaum, Centralization vs. Decentralization: A Principal-Agent Analysis, 9 J. 
PUB. ECON. THEORY 369, 378, 380 (2007). We think this story is more persuasive as to social 
insurance than for redistribution generally. There is little direct evidence individuals choose 
where to live based on their preference for redistribution. However, risk preferences, and 
hence preferences for insurance, are correlated strongly with wealth. See Lawrence Blume & 
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 
569, 603-04 (1984). There is strong evidence that individuals are geographically segregated 
by wealth. See CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS 
JUDGES 5 (1996); Douglas S. Massey & Mary J. Fischer, The Geography of Inequality in the 
United States, 1950-2000, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URBAN AFFAIRS 1, 6-29 
(2003). 
 98. See Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Shar-
ing and Moral Hazard, 64 ECONOMETRICA 623, 629-35 (1996); cf. Pablo Sanguinetti & Ma-
riano Tommasi, Intergovernmental Transfers and Fiscal Behavior: Insurance Versus Aggre-
gate Discipline, 62 J. INT’L ECON. 149, 153-54 (2004) (noting that federal guarantees induce 
fiscal recklessness by local governments). We note that the possibility of moral hazard as-
sumes asymmetric information between the central and regional governments: that is, if the 
federal government had perfect information about local finances and policies, it could set a 
subsidy rule that would eliminate opportunities for self-serving behavior by local officials. 
But, of course, that is essentially impossible. See Ben Lockwood, Inter-Regional Insurance, 
72 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 2 (1999).  
 99. See Oates, supra note 68, at 176-77; Rodden, supra note 68, at 672. 
 100. See Sanguinetti & Tomassi, supra note 98, at 151. As Persson and Tabellini note, 
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connectedness of state economies would make this increased recklessness a 
particular hazard for the national economy.101 
On balance, federalizing social insurance is therefore unappealing. The tra-
deoffs between centralized and decentralized redistribution are theoretically 
uncertain. But social insurance has some additional, clear-cut problems when 
offered at the national level.  
B. Subsidies and Tax Exporting 
Although there are hybrid regimes short of full federalization that solve 
some of the problems we have just surveyed, these regimes also create new 
problems. In the first well-known hybrid, the federal government would pro-
vide only partial financing for state budgets, as through a matching grant pro-
gram.102 A second hybrid not previously recognized in the literature for its sta-
bilization potential is tax exporting.  
Matching grants reduce the problems inherent in federal financing. Under a 
matching system, states bear some of the costs of risky policy, reducing moral 
hazard.103 Cofinancing may also reduce Ricardian equivalence. In a downturn 
with regional variation, federal borrowing on behalf of affected states in effect 
allows the harder-hit regions to shift some of the cost of repayment to others.104 
Thus, taxpayers in these worst-off areas experience higher government demand 
 
this incentive can be mitigated by offering additional subsidies to local governments to in-
vest in risk-reducing activity, but this requires that the federal government be able to verify 
that these risk-reducing grants are used as intended. See Persson & Tabellini, supra note 98, 
at 642-43. This seems a bleak possibility to us, because the difficulty of verifying local con-
ditions is exactly what leads to moral hazard in the first place. See Timothy J. Goodspeed & 
Andrew Haughwout, On the Optimal Design of Disaster Insurance in a Federation 14-19 
(Ctr. for Econ. Studies Info. & Forschung, Working Paper No. 1888, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=959998 (arguing that the federal gov-
ernment cannot observe state precautionary efforts closely enough to set the correct subsidy 
amount and cannot commit politically to withholding aid from areas that fail to invest in dis-
aster prevention). 
We note that additional incentives to take on risky new policies might be desirable to 
the extent that such policies are undersupplied by the political market. See Brian Galle & 
Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Govern-
ments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1341-98 (2009) (considering whether local governments inno-
vate suboptimally). But calibrating federal social insurance to provide the correct amount of 
additional risk taking seems a challenging task.  
101. See Oates, supra note 68, at 176. 
102. For an introduction to federal grant programs, see THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN 
FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS 99-115 (1990). 
103. See Lockwood, supra note 98, at 14 (finding that the optimal stabilization grant 
under asymmetric information provides only partial insurance); cf. WILLARD G. MANNING & 
M. SUSAN MARQUIS, RAND CORP., HEALTH INSURANCE: THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN RISK 
POOLING AND MORAL HAZARD 31 (1989) (arguing that partial personal liability of the insured 
will counterbalance moral hazard of health insurance policies); Martin S. Feldstein, The Wel-
fare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, 81 J. POL. ECON. 251 (1973) (same). 
104. See Bayoumi & Masson, supra note 54, at 1027. 
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without an accompanying drop in consumer demand.105 Matching grants also 
offer the possibility of traditional federalism benefits, such as superior informa-
tion on the part of local officials.106 
States may also have a self-help route to the same result. In this second hy-
brid, hard-hit states simply export their tax burden to other states.107 Exporting 
allows a state to diversify its revenues against negative shocks to its own econ-
omy. The tax-exporting phenomenon is very familiar in the literature, but we 
believe we are the first to observe that it represents a partial solution to the Ri-
cardian equivalence problem.  
Tax exporting is probably a poor stabilization tool, however. The stabiliza-
tion effects of tax exporting will be fairly haphazard, with costs flowing ran-
domly to states with economic ties to the exporter.108 And exporting states have 
no incentive to protect their trading partners from the negative effects of the 
exported tax.109 Thus, it is likely that in some instances exporting may result in 
transfers in the wrong direction—moving money from the hardest-hit states to 
ones that are not suffering as badly from a downturn.  
Ultimately, however, neither approach is likely to be successful because 
both strategies threaten to distort state policy. It is a familiar point that both 
federal subsidies and tax exporting give rise to fiscal externalities,110 such as 
the possibility that the cost of bailing a state out of a regional crisis could in-
crease the federal government’s own costs of borrowing, or even the chances of 
a national downturn.111 More generally, federal supports may raise state ex-
penditures above the level their citizens would have chosen in an undistorted 
political market,112 although one of us has argued in turn that theory is ambi-
guous about whether this upward distortion would be outweighed by downward 
 
105. See id. at 1030. 
106. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimen-
talism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 313 (1998). 
107. See Robert Tannenwald, Fiscal Disparity Among the States Revisited, NEW ENG. 
ECON. REV., July-Aug. 1999, at 3, 4. “Tax exporting” refers to a local tax system in which 
the incidence of the tax is borne by outsiders. See generally Charles E. McLure, Jr., The In-
terstate Exporting of State and Local Taxes: Estimates for 1962, 20 NAT’L TAX J. 49 (1967) 
(describing the phenomenon of tax exporting and measuring its extent). 
108. Cf. Levinson, supra note 35, at 724 (describing unintentional cross-border effects 
of fiscal stimulus efforts). 
109. See Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 
90 MICH. L. REV. 895, 957-58 (1992). 
110. See Thomas Aronsson & Magnus Wikstrom, Optimal Taxation and Risk-Sharing 
Arrangements in an Economic Federation, 55 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 104, 105 (2003); Gil-
lette, supra note 74, at 1055-56, 1059; Oates, supra note 68, at 175; Michael Smart, Taxation 
and Deadweight Loss in a System of Intergovernmental Transfers, 31 CANADIAN J. ECON. 
189, 205-06 (1998). 
111. See Sanguinetti & Tommasi, supra note 98, at 167. 
112. See 2 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 63-64 (1984); Gillette, supra note 74, at 1059; Edward M. Gramlich, 
Federalism and Federal Deficit Reduction, 40 NAT’L TAX J. 299, 305 (1987). 
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pressure from tax competition.113 
Subsidies also are wasteful if they cannot be turned off. Matching grants 
reduce federal funds available for other projects. State officials have little in-
centive to turn down matching funds in order to make them available for a 
more efficient project elsewhere.114 Additionally, since matching grants by de-
finition require state expenditures, fiscally strapped states may actually draw 
less funds.115 As a result of these factors, partial financing can actually transfer 
money from states where the economy is struggling to those where it is suc-
ceeding. Moreover, outside subsidies may have undesirable stabilization effects 
when states’ economies are expanding.116  
Making federal fiscal supports temporary or discretionary solves some of 
these problems, but creates others. Macroeconomists argue that the delays and 
political costs that attend enacting discretionary programs greatly reduce the 
effectiveness of any resulting expenditure.117 Perhaps the most important as-
pect of countercyclical spending is its timing, and discretionary programs mean 
that the timing of funds will depend on politics, not economic necessity.118 
Thus, experts claim that “automatic” stabilizers are much preferable to grant 
programs.119 For example, Christina Romer found historical evidence that au-
tomatic stabilizers such as the income tax were considerably more effective 
than discretionary policies.120  
Discretionary spending can be too fast as well as too slow. Officials with 
imperfect information about the duration of a downturn and political incentives 
for present over delayed spending may be inclined to spend all of a grant im-
mediately.121 But if the downturn is prolonged, or the deepest state budget 
holes in fact lag behind the onset of the decline,122 then immediate spending is 
not optimal. This is another advantage of automatic stabilization: it persists as 
long as the downturn. 
 
113. Brian Galle, Federal Grants, State Decisions, 88 B.U. L. REV. 875, 931-34 (2008). 
114. See Weingast et al., supra note 47, at 656. 
115. Super, supra note 1, at 2587-88; see Hou, supra note 1, at 123. This problem can-
not be circumvented by using block grants. Block grants reduce the need for state contribu-
tions, but that means there will also be greater moral hazard. See Super, supra note 1, at 
2589-90. 
116. See Super, supra note 1, at 2610. 
117. See, e.g., Strnad, supra note 3, at 179-80; Wildasin, supra note 11, at 9; see also 
John B. Taylor, The Lack of an Empirical Rationale for a Revival of Discretionary Fiscal 
Policy, 99 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 550, 550 (noting the consensus of earlier econ-
omists on this point) (2009); Vigneault, supra note 6, at 14. 
118. See Strnad, supra note 3, at 180; Super, supra note 1, at 2608; Vigneault, supra 
note 6, at 14. 
119. See, e.g., Strnad, supra note 3, at 180. 
120. See Romer, supra note 19, at 37. 
121. We are grateful to Jeff Strnad for highlighting this point. 
122. In fact, conventional wisdom is that because of delays in tax collection and real es-
tate assessments, budget deficits lag downturns. See Rodden & Wibbels, supra note 1, at 57. 
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It might be argued that social insurance subsidy criteria could be written ex 
ante to kick in only in subsequent crises, eliminating the need for later legisla-
tive action. But to avoid the problems of continuing subsidies, the legislature 
would have to write binding criteria to distinguish stimulus from other spend-
ing, presumably to be administered by a court, agency, or both. Thus, grant 
funds will not flow in a recession until the administrator signs off, greatly slow-
ing the expenditure of funds and offering opportunities for political rents for the 
administrator.123 Alternatively, if the criteria are easy to meet, then the moral 
hazard problem returns.  
What is needed, then, is federal fiscal support for states that turns off au-
tomatically in good times but stays on in downturns when the need for stimulus 
may outweigh the costs of policy distortions. Is it possible to design federal fis-
cal support that only operates when states need the money? It is indeed, as we 
shall now explain.  
IV. THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX AS AN AUTOMATIC STABILIZER 
In the last two Parts we showed that in the absence of outside support, state 
budgets are likely to reinforce downturns in the business cycle. However, we 
also argued that continued federal subsidies risk distorting state political deci-
sions, as well as exaggerating the growth side of the cycle. Ideally, then, we 
would have a subsidy design in which funds are curtailed automatically when 
recessions end. Given the political economy and other practical problems limit-
ing the ability of state and local politicians to commit to countercyclical taxa-
tion and spending policies, an automatic stabilizer that is largely outside of the 
control of state and local politicians and their constituents would be very attrac-
tive. These mechanisms would generate countercyclical effects without any 
proactive decisions being made on the part of political actors.124  
Surprisingly, the federal AMT already performs this function, although it 
has not yet been perfected for use as an automatic stabilizer. In one respect it 
 
123. Rodden and Wibbels find some data to suggest that central government officials 
may also deliberately reduce their support for states during downturns in order to avoid bear-
ing the political cost of revenue shortfalls. See id. at 51-52; cf. Jonathan R. Macey, Federal 
Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-
Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 284-90 (1990) (suggesting that the 
federal government delegates power to lower tiers in order to avoid costly political deci-
sions). 
Some commentators have suggested that grant programs based on formulae, such as a 
state’s unemployment rate, can function as automatic stabilizers. See, e.g., Super, supra note 
1, at 2650-51. We favor more traditional stabilizers, on the view that in practice these auto-
matic formulae are also subject to lobbying, interpretation, and inexact targeting. See Ter-
Minassian, supra note 13, at 11 (noting that formulae may encourage gaming and manipula-
tion of measurement criteria). However, we do not mean to suggest that the two are mutually 
incompatible.  
124. See Alan J. Auerbach & Daniel Feenberg, The Significance of Federal Taxes as 
Automatic Stabilizers, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2000, at 37. 
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should not be totally surprising that the AMT is a major stabilization player. 
The federal income tax is known to be an automatic stabilizer at the national 
level because its progressive structure results in tax rate reductions as income 
declines.125 In his important recent work, Yair Listokin predicts that many tax 
expenditures reduce the efficacy of this stabilization effect.126 Tax expenditures 
allow the taxpayer to reduce her income when she engages in certain expendi-
tures, such as purchasing a home. Because the net value of these expenditures 
falls when the taxpayer’s income and marginal rate decline, tax expenditures 
have the procyclical effect of reducing demand when incomes fall, and vice 
versa. Finally, Listokin notes that “phase-outs,” such as the AMT, may mitigate 
this procyclical effect by turning off the tax expenditure’s incentive power 
when income rises above a certain level.127 
This analysis can be extended to encompass the effects of federal tax pro-
visions on state budgets. We will argue in this Part that federal tax rules have 
substantial positive impact not only on state economies but also on each state’s 
ability to raise revenue. As we will explain, the AMT acts to “turn off” the ef-
fect of these tax rules as taxpayer income rises. In effect, then, federal tax law 
provides states with a subsidy, but the AMT causes that subsidy to diminish 
when state economies are performing well. We will first explain the basic tax 
rules that provide for this result and then offer empirical evidence that our 
theory is correct. 
A. Tax Mechanics of the AMT  
First, what is the AMT? It is “alternative” only in the sense that sinking is 
the alternative to floating; taxpayers are dragged into its reach, rather than opt-
ing in. In essence, the AMT is a parallel tax code. Taxpayers must compute 
their liability under both the AMT and the rest of the tax code and pay whi-
chever sum is higher.128 In general, the AMT has a broader base but slightly 
less progressive rates.129 By broader base we mean that many items that reduce 
tax under the standard income tax do not affect AMT liability—the AMT disal-
lows a number of the standard tax system’s deductions and credits. 
1. General features of the AMT 
While marginal rates vary under the standard system from ten to thirty-five 
percent, the AMT has two rates, twenty-six and twenty-eight percent.130 Both 
 
125. See id.; Strnad, supra note 3, at 180. 
126. See Listokin, supra note 3, at 10-22. 
127. See id. at 18-20. 
128. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 4, at 2. 
129. See id. at 19. 
130. Id. at 2. 
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systems also phase out certain exclusions so that at very high incomes, effec-
tive rates may be higher.131 Under the standard income tax, individual taxpay-
ers pay no tax until they earn about $10,000 because of the combination of the 
personal exemption and standard deduction.132 Under the AMT, there is no 
standard deduction, but the personal exemption is very large, so that an indi-
vidual paid no tax (in 2009) until she earned $46,700.133 This exclusion amount 
is not indexed for inflation, which is why more and more people have become 
subject to AMT liability over the years.134 The exclusion amount for married 
couples filing jointly is less than double the individual exclusion,135 so families 
are more likely to pay the AMT. 
Typically, taxpayers become subject to the AMT because their taxable in-
come under the standard income tax was reduced by deductions that are not 
available under the AMT.136 For instance, suppose a single taxpayer, Galle, 
with a gross income of $100,000. Galle first computes his liability under the 
standard income tax. If he does not “itemize” and simply claims the standard 
deduction, he reduces his income by $8950 for the personal exemption and 
standard deduction, leaving $91,050. Different portions of this money are taxed 
at different rates, because of the tax code’s progressive rate structure. Ultimate-
ly, Galle will owe about $19,479 in tax, an average rate of roughly 21%. He 
now checks his AMT liability. Under the AMT, he would have taxable income 
of only $53,300 after the personal exemption. Twenty-six percent of $53,300 is 
only $13,858. This is, of course, smaller than his standard income tax liability, 
so he owes no AMT. 
Consider now Klick, who instead of taking the standard deduction and per-
sonal exemption, claims exemptions for numerous children and itemizes his 
deductions, reducing his $100,000 gross income to $51,000 taxable income.137 
Klick’s tax liability under the standard system is about $9088. The AMT does 
not permit exemptions for additional dependents; suppose Klick’s itemized de-
ductions, too, are not permitted under the AMT. In that case, his AMT liability 
is $13,858. Since that is the higher amount, he pays it. Thus, we would say that 
Klick is “subject” to the AMT; the AMT increases his tax by $4770.  
Because of the large exclusion amount, the likelihood of being subject to 
AMT liability increases with income, at least at low and moderate income le-
vels.138 That is, no matter how many child exemptions he claimed, if Klick’s 
 
131. See id. at 21. 
132. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 63(c)(2), 151 (2006); Rev. Proc. 2009-50 § 3.11, 2009-45 I.R.B. 
617, 622.  
133. AMT Parameters, 1993-2009, TAX POL’Y CENTER (Dec. 28, 2009), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=539. 
134. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 4, at 7. 
135. See AMT Parameters, 1993-2009, supra note 133. 
136. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 4, at 7. 
137. Our example assumes (counterfactually) that Klick is unmarried.  
138. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 4, at 20. 
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gross income were less than $46,700, the AMT could not have affected him, 
because AMT liability for everyone earning less than $46,700 is zero. And 
AMT liability for those earning $46,701 is only twenty-six cents. So the like-
lihood of becoming “subject” to the AMT is the result of a combination of in-
creasing income and increasing use of deductions and exemptions prohibited by 
the AMT. This connection between the AMT and income turns out to be crucial 
to our argument, as we develop more fully in Part IV.A.2. 
Another implication of this structure is that the AMT makes useless a 
number of deductions and exclusions available under the tax code. Suppose that 
one of Klick’s itemized deductions were accelerated depreciation on business 
equipment, which he purchased precisely because he believed it would reduce 
his taxable income. However, because of the AMT, Klick paid more in tax than 
he expected. In our example, AMT liability was only higher by $4770, so Klick 
lost $4770 worth of the value of his depreciation deduction. In other cases, 
AMT liability may be much higher than standard income tax liability, so that 
effectively the taxpayer receives none of the economic benefit of her deduc-
tions. We refer to that scenario as one in which the AMT “turns off” the deduc-
tions whose benefits were lost.  
Not all the deductions available under the standard income tax are unavail-
able under the AMT. Many important adjustments, such as the costs of operat-
ing a for-profit business, interest expenses related to a purchase-money mort-
gage on a primary residence, and the exclusion for insurance premiums paid by 
an employer, all reduce both AMT income as well as standard taxable in-
come.139 Several other major adjustments to income are unavailable under the 
AMT, as we now elaborate. 
2. State and local taxes 
For many years by far the most important item disallowed by the AMT was 
the deduction for taxes paid to state and local governments (SALT), § 164 of 
the tax code.140 Disallowance of the SALT deduction continues to account for 
just under half of all the AMT’s revenues.141 
 
139. See 26 U.S.C. § 56 (2006) (limiting certain other tax preferences under the AMT); 
id. § 106(a) (employer-provided health insurance premiums); id. § 162(a) (trade or business 
expenses); id. § 163(h) (home mortgage interest). 
140. See Greg Leiserson & Jeffrey Rohaly, The Individual Alternative Minimum Tax: 
Historical Data and Projections, TAX POL’Y CENTER, 6 (June 2008), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/uploadedpdf/411703_individual_amt.pdf. 
The SALT deduction has become somewhat less dominant as incomes have crept up 
above the AMT’s personal exemption amount, owing to the fact that large state tax bills are 
usually the product of large incomes. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra 
note 4, at 17. That is, because the AMT now affects households with lower incomes than it 
once did, deductions and exemptions that are more common in low-income households have 
gained significance.  
141. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 4, at 18 tbl.4. 
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The AMT’s effects on the SALT deduction account for much of the 
AMT’s power as an automatic state revenue stabilizer. The SALT deduction 
acts like a federal matching grant for certain state tax revenues.142 For every 
dollar a taxpayer pays her state and local governments in income and property 
taxes, she reduces her federal tax bill by one dollar times her marginal federal 
rate.143 So, for a taxpayer in the top federal bracket, each dollar of state income 
tax reduces federal tax by $0.35. Taxpayers in states without an income tax 
may also elect to deduct their total annual sales and use taxes paid.144  
Thus, the SALT deduction functions as a subsidy for state and local gov-
ernments.145 First, it induces a substitution effect in favor of state and local tax-
ation.146 A local taxpayer facing the choice between savings, private consump-
tion, and consumption of government services (i.e., higher taxes) should prefer 
government services because a dollar’s worth of government services costs her 
only $0.65, while a dollar’s worth of savings or private consumption costs $1. 
The deduction also likely increases demand for local government through an 
income effect. Assuming local government services are a so-called “normal” 
good, in which demand rises as income rises, the taxpayer’s higher after-
federal-tax wealth should produce a greater demand for local government ser-
vices.  
Earlier empirical work is inconclusive on whether deductibility has an up-
ward influence on deductible state and local tax levels. Some find that deducti-
bility increases the total amount of tax collected by the state, while others sug-
gest that taxes may simply be shifted from deductible to nondeductible 
forms.147 Our findings support the first view, as we will explain. 
 
142. See Charles E. McClure, Jr. & George R. Zodrow, Treasury I and the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986: The Economics and Politics of Tax Reform, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1987, at 
37, 55. 
143. Kirk J. Stark, Fiscal Federalism and Tax Progressivity: Should the Federal In-
come Tax Encourage State Redistribution?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1389, 1414 (2004). 
144. 26 U.S.C. § 164(b)(5) (2006). A use tax is a mirror image of the sales tax, but is 
imposed on the out-of-state purchase of goods. See Walter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax 
Income and Consumption in the New Economy: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 
38 GA. L. REV. 1, 20 (2003). For an interesting analysis of the complex interaction between 
the sales tax election and other choices, see Herwig Schlunk, Why Every State Should Have 
an Income Tax (and Retail Sales Tax, Too), 78 MISS. L.J. 637, 677-81 (2009). 
145. In making this claim, we do not intend also to take a position on whether the 
SALT deduction can be justified as a matter of the normative definition of the ideal tax base. 
For further discussion of that issue, see Galle, supra note 73. 
146. See Lawrence B. Lindsey, Federal Deductibility of State and Local Taxes: A Test 
of Public Choice by Representative Government, in FISCAL FEDERALISM: QUANTITATIVE 
STUDIES 137, 169 (Harvey S. Rosen ed., 1988).  
147. Studies finding higher revenues from deductible categories include Douglas Holtz-
Eakin & Harvey Rosen, Federal Deductibility and Local Property Tax Rates, 27 J. URB. 
ECON. 269, 270 (1990); Edward M. Gramlich, The Deductibility of State and Local Taxes, 38 
NAT’L TAX J. 447, 453-58 (1985); and those surveyed in Bruce Bartlett, The Case for Elimi-
nating Deductibility of State and Local Taxes, 28 TAX NOTES 1121, 1122-23 (1985). Those 
pressing the tax-base-shifting argument, albeit without any empirical evidence, include 
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The AMT modifies the SALT subsidy by reducing the size of the grant for 
economically thriving jurisdictions. As incomes in a state rise, more and more 
of the state’s taxpayers will exceed the AMT’s personal exemption threshold, 
so that the AMT will “turn off” some or all of their SALT deductions. Con-
versely, as incomes fall, the AMT’s effects will diminish, turning the SALT 
subsidy back on. We examine empirically whether the AMT in fact is related to 
income in Part IV.B.  
This variable, countercyclical subsidy has at least two distinct stabilization 
effects for states. First, it mitigates most of the constraints states normally face 
in maintaining or increasing tax rates during downturns. Recall that descriptive-
ly, states cannot raise rates because of tax competition with other states. The 
deduction, when it is effective, reduces this exit pressure (or the credible threat 
of it) by diminishing the after-tax cost of any given state’s own taxes. On the 
normative side, states should attempt to smooth rates over time.148 The 
AMT/SALT combination allows states to achieve similar effective net-of-
federal-tax rates during crises and other times, as we illustrate here with Fig-
ure 1.149 
 
George R. Zodrow, Eliminating State and Local Tax Deductibility: A General Equilibrium 
Model of Revenue Effects, in FISCAL FEDERALISM: QUANTITATIVE STUDIES 177 (Harvey S. 
Rosen ed., 1988); and Martin S. Feldstein & Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Effect of Federal Tax 
Deductibility on State and Local Taxes and Spending, 95 J. POL. ECON. 710 (1987). The 
AMT was not empirically significant during this period. See Leiserson & Rohaly, supra note 
140, at 10 tbl.2 (showing that total number of taxpayers nationwide subject to the AMT was 
430,000 in 1985 and 200,000 in 1990, compared to 33.4 million today). 
A subsequent study purported to find evidence that deductibility led states simply to 
shift tax bases without also increasing overall tax revenues. See Paul N. Courant & Edward 
M. Gramlich, The Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on State and Local Fiscal Behavior, 
in DO TAXES MATTER? THE IMPACT OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 243, 244-63 (Joel 
Slemrod ed., 1990). Kaplow, reviewing the various data, calls the evidence for the shifting 
theory “conflicting.” Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and 
Local Taxes Under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 487 & n.206 (1996).  
The Courant and Gramlich study provides unconvincing evidence that deductibility 
cannot increase revenues because the study could not control for several possible confound-
ing factors. Courant and Gramlich studied the effect of the 1986 repeal of federal deductibili-
ty of state and local sales taxes. See Courant & Gramlich, supra, at 244. At the same time, 
federal marginal rates changed dramatically, greatly altering the value of deductibility. See 
Stephen H. Pollock, Mechanisms for Exporting the State Sales Tax Burden in the Absence of 
Federal Deductibility, 44 NAT’L TAX J. 297, 297-99 (1991). And, too, sales taxes are both 
hard to deduct (such that their prior deductibility may have been more theoretical than real) 
and uniquely useful as a means for tax exporting. See id. at 297-99, 306. Thus, looking only 
at the 1986 change offers at best mixed information about the importance of deductibility for 
other revenue sources. See Gilbert E. Metcalf, Deductibility and Optimal State and Local 
Fiscal Policy, 39 ECON. LETTERS 217, 221 (1992). So loss of deductibility might well present 
a much more serious blow to state revenues for other forms of tax. 
148. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. 
149. The figure simplifies reality somewhat. In actuality, only some taxpayers will ben-
efit from the SALT deduction even in severe downturns, so that effective rates for other 
earners will increase if the jurisdiction raises rates across the board. Normatively, then, the 
jurisdiction in crisis should aim to limit tax rate increases for those who remain subject to the 
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FIGURE 1 
  
 SALT Deduction “Off” SALT Deduction “On” 
Gross Income $1800 $900 
State Income Tax Rate 11% 16.5% 
State Income Tax Amount $200 $150 
Reduction in Federal Tax 
(Assume Marginal Rate  
of 33%) 
$0 $50 
State Tax Net of Federal Tax 
Reduction 
$200 $100 
Effective State Income Tax 
Rate 
11% 11% 
 
Note: Although the state raises tax rates during a downturn, when income declines the AMT allows the 
SALT deduction to phase back in, resulting in no net change in effective state income tax rates. 
 
The second effect of the AMT/SALT combination is to allow a careful 
state to increase taxes without reducing consumers’ marginal propensity to 
spend on other consumer goods. Again, countercyclical federal subsidies act as 
interjurisdictional transfers, increasing the wealth of a region affected by a 
downturn. If the state absorbs no more than this transfer amount in increased 
taxes, consumer spending will be unaffected. This is illustrated in Figure 2. Al-
ternately, even if the state does not increase its tax revenues or its spending, 
there will be some stimulative effect from the SALT deduction, because the 
state’s citizens will be the beneficiaries of transfers from less affected parts of 
the country, raising their wealth available for consumption.  
 
 
 
AMT, unless those earners exhibit little elasticity in their response to a higher rate. As a 
practical matter, however, it will likely be difficult to change rates selectively only for those 
spared the AMT, which is one reason we write that the AMT/SALT pairing only mitigates 
state tax constraints. 
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FIGURE 2 
 
 SALT Deduction “Off” SALT Deduction “On” 
Gross Income $1800 $900 
State Tax Amount $200 $150 
Federal Tax Amount (Assume 
Marginal Rate of 33%) 
$600 
$250 
($300 − ($150 × 0.33)) 
Total Tax Paid $800 $400 
Net After-Tax Income as % of 
Total Income 
55.6%  
($1000/$1800) 
55.6%  
($500/$900) 
 
Note: Although the state increases its tax revenues during a downturn, the AMT allows the SALT deduc-
tion to phase back in, resulting in no net change in the average taxpayer’s proportion of after-tax in-
come available for consumption. 
 
Formally, in the case where state and local tax costs are deductible from 
the federal income tax, a representative voter’s demand curve for the social in-
surance program i is given by Qi = f(ti(1 − tf ), I, px), where ti represents the 
per capita tax cost of each unit of the program, tf represents the average federal 
tax rate faced by the individual,  represents the fraction of state and local tax 
expenditures that is deductible on the federal tax return, I is the individual’s in-
come, and px is the price of a composite private consumption good. In this case, 
the federal government absorbs some of the individual’s tax cost for the social 
insurance program. By the law of demand, because  lies in the unit interval, as 
the fraction of deductibility increases, the individual demands more of the so-
cial insurance program. 
To see how the AMT works as an automatic stabilizer in this framework, 
note that because social insurance programs are normal goods, when the indi-
vidual’s income I increases, so does his demand for the program. However, 
given that the application of the AMT is positively related to income,  will 
decline with income until it reaches zero in the limit. These two effects of 
changing income will have opposite effects on the quantity of the social insur-
ance program demanded. Thus, in times of economic growth, while the per-
son’s income effect will induce him to demand more of the program, the price 
effect will induce him to demand less as the AMT phases out the federal subsi-
dy. In times of recession, as incomes drop, the income effect will induce a low-
er demand, while the price effect will induce a higher demand because the 
AMT phaseout revives the federal subsidy. Thus, as a theoretical matter the 
AMT is countercyclical, dampening demand swings caused by changes in in-
come.  
In sum, the AMT modifies the SALT deduction so that it better matches 
the ideal federal fiscal subsidy. The AMT concentrates federal subsidies in 
states where income is falling, diminishing any distortive or inflationary effects 
of the subsidy at other times. We will examine empirical evidence for this 
proposition in Parts IV.B and V. 
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3. Other provisions 
In addition to the SALT deduction, the AMT also turns off a number of 
other adjustments available under the standard income tax. Few of these other 
provisions have any empirical significance.150 We therefore focus here on the 
two we view as the most important of this motley remainder. The first, the ex-
emption for additional dependents, is a large component of the AMT but has 
little direct effect on state finances.151 The second, the deductibility of home 
equity interest, involves a small number of AMT taxpayers but has a more di-
rect connection to states’ fiscal health.152 
Just under half of all taxpayers who pay the AMT do so because it disal-
lows their dependent exemptions.153 Under the standard income tax, parents of 
dependent children and caretakers for adults with disabilities can reduce their 
taxable income by roughly $3500 per dependent.154 This adjustment is not 
available under the AMT, with the result that families with many children and 
income above the AMT personal exemption amount are likely to face AMT 
liability.155  
The dependent exemption’s impact on state business cycles is fairly muted. 
As with the SALT deduction, the AMT will tend to channel more federal mon-
ey to a region through the exemption when average earnings fall. This in-
creased wealth will strengthen consumption and, if government services are 
normal goods, there will be an income effect, somewhat increasing support for 
local taxing and spending.  
Targeting funds specifically to large families makes some policy sense. 
From a microeconomic perspective, bigger households must pay more to meet 
their bare essentials, making the value of income smoothing higher. And, from 
a macroeconomic perspective, there is evidence that families with many depen-
dents have a higher marginal propensity to spend a fiscal stimulus.156 That is, 
 
150. AMT Preference Items 2002, 2004-2007, TAX POL’Y CENTER (July 27, 2010), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=468. For a complete listing 
and explanation of each provision, see STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 
4, at 2-4. 
151. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 4, at 17-18 & tbl.4 (re-
porting that in 2007, 42.7% of AMT payers lost personal exemptions they could have 
claimed under the standard income tax). 
152. See id. at 18 tbl.3 (stating that in 2007, under two million taxpayers lost “other pre-
ferences and adjustments,” including the home equity interest deduction). 
153. See id. at 18 tbl.4. 
154. See 26 U.S.C. § 151(d)(1), (4) (2006) (setting amount at $2000 in 1989 dollars, ad-
justed for inflation). 
155. Leonard E. Burman, The Alternative Minimum Tax: Assault on the Middle Class, 
MILKEN INST. REV., Fourth Quarter 2007, at 12, 14, available at http://www.urban.org/     
UploadedPDF/1001113_Burman_AMT.pdf. 
156. See David S. Johnson et al., Household Expenditure and the Income Tax Rebates 
of 2001, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 1589, 1597 tbl.2 (2006). Families with dependent children may 
also have increased demand for local government services, such as schools and public safety. 
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they will save less of the stimulus, increasing its effectiveness. 
Deductions for home equity loans are a less common source of AMT liabil-
ity, but translate more directly into stabilization policy. The standard income 
tax allows borrowers to deduct the costs of interest on up to $100,000 worth of 
loans secured by, but not used to purchase, a residence—in other words, on 
home equity loans.157 The AMT retains a deduction for “purchase money” 
debt, but turns off the home equity loans deduction.158 Fewer than 1.6% of 
AMT taxpayers lost a home equity deduction in 2007.159 
Subsidies for home equity loans are stimulative in two ways. First, the 
home equity loan is essentially negative savings—it changes accumulated net 
worth (positive equity) into cash, which presumably is to be used for immediate 
consumption. This is a classic countercyclical effect: when falling incomes turn 
on the home equity deduction, homeowners become more inclined to spend, 
and vice versa.160 Although diminished wealth might reduce an owner’s mar-
ginal propensity to consume, the home equity subsidy creates a substitution ef-
fect, making consumption cheaper relative to other choices.  
States may also benefit from the home equity deduction through higher 
property taxes. Tax benefits that may be claimed only by homeowners increase 
the value of owning over renting. Thus, the tax benefit should “capitalize,” or 
be reflected in the sale price of homes.161 If (as is generally true) property taxes 
are based on appraised value, this increase in value will also increase property 
tax revenues.162 The AMT likely reduces the degree of capitalization by mak-
ing it uncertain whether a buyer will be able to obtain the tax benefits of a 
home equity loan. At a guess, we would predict that this uncertainty would be 
higher during times when many taxpayers are subject to the AMT, making the 
deduction somewhat countercyclical. But we freely concede that this is pure 
speculation. 
  
*   *   * 
 
So far, we have set out a general theory of the countercyclical effects of the 
AMT. In the next Subpart, we will attempt to quantify more precisely the signi-
ficance of these effects. 
 
157. 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(3)(C) (2006). 
158. Id. § 56(b)(1)(C) (2006). 
159. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 4, at 18 tbl.4. However, 
the total dollar value of the miscellaneous lost deduction in 2007 was more than eight billion 
dollars. Id. at tbl.3. 
160. See Listokin, supra note 3, at 16. 
161. See Wallace E. Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on 
Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J. 
POL. ECON. 957, 966-67 (1969). 
162. See Julie Roin, The Consequences of Undoing the Federal Income Tax, 70 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 319, 331 (2003). 
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B. AMT Liability Is Increasing in Income at the Jurisdictional Level  
Our argument here depends on the assumption that AMT liability in a ju-
risdiction rises together with income. This is an intuitive point at low income 
levels. However, the standard tax system imposes a 35% maximum rate,163 
while the AMT tops out at 28%. Thus, it is theoretically ambiguous whether 
jurisdictions with higher average incomes experience greater AMT liability.164 
Accordingly, we present here empirical evidence that AMT liability is increas-
ing in income at the jurisdictional level.  
Using IRS Statistics of Income data from 2004-2007,165 we plot the rela-
tionship between state per capita GDP and the fraction of income tax filers who 
paid a positive AMT on their federal return in Figure 3.166 The data include ob-
servations for all fifty states.167 In addition to the scatter plot, we provide a li-
near best-fit line through the data as well as its 95% confidence interval. 
 
163. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 4, at 12. 
164.  See id. 
165. Public SOI data include the AMT data beginning only in 2004. State-level individ-
ual income tax data are collected at SOI Tax Stats—Historic Table 2, IRS.GOV, 
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=171535,00.html (last updated Sept. 2, 2010). 
166. Note that for the graphs that follow, a similar picture emerges if one conditions on 
average state tax rates, suggesting that this correlation is not simply the result of high income 
states having higher tax rates. 
167. Note that the cluster of observations with very low AMT shares, but high per capi-
ta GDP, represent Delaware, which has a relatively low tax burden despite the relatively high 
state income levels. See Delaware’s State and Local Tax Burden, 1977-2008, TAX FOUND. 
(Aug. 27, 2008), http://www.taxfoundation.org/taxdata/show/446.html. 
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Figure 3 shows a statistically significant positive relationship between AMT 
incidence and state per capita income. Further, this relationship endures and is 
statistically significant at each point of the income distribution. Figure 4 pro-
vides the same graph using data only for the returns of those individuals mak-
ing more than $50,000 in a year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 further restricts attention to returns of individuals making more 
than $75,000. 
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Figure 6 examines returns of individuals earning more than $100,000. 
 
 
Lastly, Figure 7 provides the graph for those with incomes greater than 
$200,000 (the last income group for which the IRS provides AMT break-
downs). 
 
Within each income category, the fraction of returns with a positive AMT 
amount is increasing in per capita state GDP, providing strong support for the 
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assumption that the AMT is likely to affect a larger fraction of state residents 
during economic boom times in the state than during economic downturns. 
The scatter plots also show that while AMT incidence is low in the popula-
tion overall, it is a significant fact of life among those earning more than 
$200,000 annually. This disparity suggests an important story about the possi-
ble impact of the AMT. If high earners are disproportionately sensitive to the 
AMT, or have a high degree of political influence, the AMT may well be an 
important determinant of state spending. We turn now to examining that effect. 
V. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF STABILIZATION EFFECT 
If the AMT works as an automatic fiscal stabilizer, we should find that 
public spending on social insurance programs at the state level decreases as the 
fraction of state taxpayers subject to the AMT increases, conditional on state 
income.168 As implied above, state spending in these areas is hypothesized as a 
normal good, thus we should find that as income goes up, spending goes up as 
well. Further, as the AMT covers a greater fraction of individuals, the price of 
that public spending increases for them. This price increase, all other things 
equal, should lead these individuals to reduce their support for the spending. If 
state politicians are sensitive to voter interests, this should lead to a decline in 
spending. 
A. State Spending 
To examine these predictions empirically, we collected data on state per 
capita spending in four common social insurance categories: welfare spending, 
education spending, spending on hospitals, and spending on other public health 
programs.169 Because our AMT coverage data is only available beginning in 
2004, our sample covers the period of 2004-2007. Because four years of data 
provides a relatively small sample, we expect that our estimates will be rela-
tively imprecise, limiting our ability to make strong inferences. That is, the 
large standard errors likely to be associated with our estimated coefficients 
suggest we will have low power, making it harder for us to reject the hypothe-
sis that there is no relationship between AMT coverage and state spending.170 
To account for any effects of inflation on state spending, we use the con-
 
168. That is, for two states with identical income, the one with a higher total AMT lia-
bility spends less on social insurance. 
 169. These data come from the Survey of State Government Finances, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/govs/state (last updated July 15, 2010). We view education 
as social insurance because, among other reasons, retraining (for adults) and investing in a 
child’s future income are both household responses to the loss of employment for one of its 
current earners. 
170. For a discussion of the relationship between sample size and statistical power, see 
MICHAEL O. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 182 (2d ed. 2001). 
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sumer price index (CPI) to deflate all expenditure and income amounts to a 
constant price level.171 Because our outcome variables are per capita spending, 
to provide estimates that are representative of average effects across the nation, 
we perform weighted least squares using state population as the weight in each 
regression.172 
We provide descriptive statistics (again, weighted by population) in Ta-
ble 1. 
 
TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Description Mean St. Dev. Source 
Spending 
Real state government spending 
per capita on education, welfare, 
hospitals, and public health 
1590 313 Census 
Education 
Spending 
Real state government spending 
per capita on education 
798 146 Census 
Welfare 
Spending 
Real state government spending 
per capita on welfare 
629 185 Census 
Hospital 
Spending 
Real state government spending 
per capita on hospitals 
75 43 Census 
Health 
Spending 
Real state government spending 
per capita on public health 
88 41 Census 
AMT Share 
Share of federal returns paying 
AMT > 0 
0.027 0.015 IRS 
AMT Share 
50k+ 
Share of federal returns paying 
AMT > 0 for filers with in-
comes > $50,000 
0.081 0.038 IRS 
AMT Share 
75k+ 
Share of federal returns paying 
AMT > 0 for filers with in-
comes > $75,000 
0.134 0.057 IRS 
AMT Share 
100k+ 
Share of federal returns paying 
AMT > 0 for filers with in-
comes > $100,000 
0.220 0.082 IRS 
AMT Share 
200k+ 
Share of federal returns paying 
AMT > 0 for filers with in-
comes > $200,000 
0.601 0.160 IRS 
Income Real state per capita GDP 18,661 2669 BEA 
 
Note: Sample covers 2004-2007. All variables weighted by state population. 
 
 
171. CPI data are available at Consumer Price Index, BUREAU LAB. STAT., 
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2010). Prices from 1982-1984 provide 
the base year for price comparisons. 
172. See JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS 
ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION 92 (2009). 
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Our empirical specification includes our AMT coverage variable and the 
state income variable as discussed above. Also, to isolate the effect of AMT 
coverage, we include dummy variables for each state. These so-called state 
fixed effects allow for heterogeneity across states in their baseline level of 
spending. For idiosyncratic reasons, such as cultural differences or other path 
dependencies, some states may naturally spend more on social insurance pro-
grams than others. The state fixed effects allow us to control for these differ-
ences, which is important if the differences are not random with respect to the 
AMT coverage variable. We also include dummy variables for each year to al-
low for the possibility that spending may be systematically higher (or lower) in 
a given year across all states. Reasons for this may include national macroeco-
nomic changes or policy changes at the federal level that induce a change in 
spending everywhere. 
As a technical matter, we allow for clustering of standard errors at the state 
level. Doing so allows for dependence among observations within a state over 
time. Specifically, because there is likely some inertia in state spending pro-
grams, as well as in the fraction of individuals who pay the AMT each year 
within a state, the observations from, for example, Pennsylvania in 2004 and 
2005 are unlikely to be statistically independent. If there is positive dependence 
(e.g., if higher state spending in one year likely leads to relatively high state 
spending in the next), failure to allow for clustering will understate the true 
standard errors of the relevant coefficients. On the other hand, if there is nega-
tive dependence (e.g., if high spending in one year is offset by lower spending 
in the next), the true standard errors of the relevant coefficients will be over-
stated.173 Along the same lines, there may be dependence across observations 
within a given year. Such dependence could be the result of changes in federal 
policy that affect spending in all states in a way that is not completely ac-
counted for by year fixed effects. Similarly, changes in the tax code or macroe-
conomic changes may affect the coverage of the AMT across all states in a way 
not fully controlled for in the regression itself. To allow for these effects, we 
also provide standard errors that account for multiway clustering.174 
Our first analysis looks at real (i.e., deflated) state per capita spending 
across education, welfare, hospitals, and public health in the aggregate. We first 
examine total AMT coverage. However, there is reason to believe that not eve-
ryone accurately predicts whether the AMT will be binding on them.175 This 
implies that errors in expectations will affect whether an individual supports 
spending or not. Our hypothesis is that higher income people will be better able 
 
173. For a discussion of this problem, see Marianne Bertrand et al., How Much Should 
We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?, 119 Q.J. ECON. 249 (2004). 
174. These problems and their solution are discussed in A. Colin Cameron, Jonah B. 
Gelbach, & Douglas L. Miller, Robust Inference with Multi-way Clustering (UC Davis Dep’t 
of Econ., Working Paper No. 09-9, 2009), available at http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/     
working_papers/09-9.pdf. 
175. See infra text accompanying notes 183-93. 
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to predict that they will be affected by the AMT.176 To examine this, we pro-
vide five different measures of AMT coverage: 1) the fraction of all federal re-
turns paying a positive AMT amount; 2) the fraction of all federal returns pay-
ing a positive AMT amount for individuals with incomes above $50,000; 3) the 
fraction of all federal returns paying a positive AMT amount for individuals 
with incomes above $75,000; 4) the fraction of all federal returns paying a posi-
tive AMT amount for individuals with incomes above $100,000; and 5) the 
fraction of all federal returns paying a positive AMT amount for individuals 
with incomes above $200,000. Our expectation is that we will observe greater 
precision of any AMT effect in the higher income ranges. Regression results 
are provided in Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2 
AMT Coverage and Total State Per Capita Spending 
(Standard Errors Clustered at the State Level in Parentheses) 
[Standard Errors Multiway Clustered at the State and Year Level in Brackets] 
      
AMT Share 
−776 
(4097) 
[7162] 
    
AMT Share 
50k+ 
 
−1667 
(1120) 
[1568] 
   
AMT Share 
75k+ 
  
−1403       
(629)** 
   [687]** 
  
AMT Share 
100k+ 
   
−1023       
  (387)**  
[329]*** 
 
AMT Share 
200k+ 
    
 −805         
  (308)**    
[246]*** 
Income 
0.030 
(0.019) 
[0.013] 
0.023 
(0.020) 
  [0.013]* 
0.019 
(0.020) 
[0.013] 
0.016 
(0.019) 
[0.013] 
0.012 
(0.019) 
[0.015] 
Note: Sample covers 2004-2007. All regressions are estimated with population weights. All regressions 
include state and year fixed effects. 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 (against a two-sided test of the null hypothesis of no effect). 
 
As shown in Table 2, in every case we find a negative relationship between 
AMT coverage and total per capita state spending on social insurance pro-
grams. The effect is statistically significant once the AMT share variable is cal-
culated for filers with incomes of $75,000 or above, and, as expected, the preci-
 
176. Additionally, at very low income levels AMT payers pay little in state tax, see su-
pra note 140, and therefore the AMT is unlikely to affect their views of state tax levels.  
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sion of the estimates improves as the AMT share is calculated for higher in-
come filers. We also find evidence that state spending on social insurance pro-
grams does appear to be a normal good, with positive per capita GDP coeffi-
cients, but the effect is not statistically significant. This is most likely due to the 
lack of precision that comes with our four-year sample. 
In terms of the practical size of the effects we estimate, if the fraction of 
AMT coverage among filers earning more than $50,000 increased by a standard 
deviation, our results imply that total real per capita state spending on social 
insurance programs would decline by about 4%. The comparable effect of an 
increase in the fraction of AMT filers with incomes above $200,000 is an 8% 
decline in per capita spending.177 The exact magnitude of these figures is less 
interesting, however, than the fact that the practical size of the effect we have 
identified is nontrivial from a policy perspective. 
 
177. Thus, states in roughly the top one-sixth of the national distribution of AMT liabil-
ity would spend 8% less on social insurance annually than the median state—tens of millions 
of dollars each year.  
One might assume that some of this effect will be countered by the income effect, 
which implies that as more individuals fall under the AMT, incomes are rising, leading to 
increased support for public spending. While this is possible, this counteracting income ef-
fect need not be present because the income effect is based on real income and the AMT is 
not indexed for inflation. 
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In Table 3, we examine the effect of AMT coverage on real state per capita 
spending on education. 
 
TABLE 3 
AMT Coverage and State Per Capita Education Spending 
(Standard Errors Clustered at the State Level in Parentheses) 
[Standard Errors Multiway Clustered at the State and Year Level in Brackets] 
      
AMT Share 
−30 
(1786) 
[2320] 
    
AMT Share 
50k+ 
 
−310 
(627) 
[591] 
   
AMT Share 
75k+ 
  
−299 
(383) 
[308] 
  
AMT Share 
100k+ 
   
−229 
(238) 
[185] 
 
AMT Share 
200k+ 
    
−301 
(227) 
[184] 
Income 
0.015     
(0.009)*  
[0.008]** 
0.014 
(0.009) 
 [0.008]* 
0.013 
(0.009) 
[0.008] 
0.012 
(0.009) 
[0.008] 
0.008 
(0.008) 
[0.009] 
Note: Sample covers 2004-2007. All regressions are estimated with population weights. All regressions 
include state and year fixed effects. 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 (against a two-sided test of the null hypothesis of no effect). 
 
Although we continue to find a negative effect of AMT coverage on state 
per capita education spending, our results are imprecise, and only the result as-
sociated with AMT filers with incomes above $200,000 is even close to being 
statistically significant at the 10% level. We also continue to find that education 
spending’s relationship with state per capita income is positive. 
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In Table 4, we look at welfare spending. 
 
TABLE 4 
AMT Coverage and State Per Capita Welfare Spending 
(Standard Errors Clustered at the State Level in Parentheses) 
[Standard Errors Multiway Clustered at the State and Year Level in Brackets] 
      
AMT Share 
739 
(2760) 
[4478] 
    
AMT Share 
50k+ 
 
−572 
(786) 
[1005] 
   
AMT Share 
75k+ 
  
−574 
(461) 
[478] 
  
AMT Share 
100k+ 
   
−448 
(290) 
 [252]* 
 
AMT Share 
200k+ 
    
−112 
(204) 
[151] 
Income 
0.001 
(0.013) 
[0.008] 
−0.003 
(0.013) 
[0.008] 
−0.005 
(0.013) 
[0.009] 
−0.007 
(0.013) 
[0.009] 
−0.003 
(0.015) 
[0.011] 
Note: Sample covers 2004-2007. All regressions are estimated with population weights. All regressions 
include state and year fixed effects. 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 (against a two-sided test of the null hypothesis of no effect). 
 
For per capita welfare spending, we find support for the negative effect of 
AMT coverage on spending except when we look at AMT filers of all income 
levels, including those earning less than $50,000. The precision of the results is 
quite low, leading us to find that the result is statistically significant (at the 10% 
level) only when we focus on AMT filers making above $100,000. 
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Next we examine real state per capita spending on hospitals in Table 5. 
 
TABLE 5 
AMT Coverage and State Per Capita Hospital Spending 
(Standard Errors Clustered at the State Level in Parentheses) 
[Standard Errors Multiway Clustered at the State and Year Level in Brackets] 
      
AMT Share 
−860       
(543)      
  [293]*** 
    
AMT Share 
50k+ 
 
−352       
(228)       
[137]*** 
   
AMT Share 
75k+ 
  
−218      
(145)      
[75]*** 
  
AMT Share 
100k+ 
   
−134       
(92)       
 [46]*** 
 
AMT Share 
200k+ 
    
−115   
(80)   
[65]* 
Income 
0.002 
(0.002) 
[0.002] 
0.001 
(0.002) 
[0.002] 
0.001 
(0.002) 
[002] 
0.001 
(0.003) 
[0.002] 
0.000 
(0.003) 
[0.002] 
Note: Sample covers 2004-2007. All regressions are estimated with population weights. All regressions 
include state and year fixed effects. 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 (against a two-sided test of the null hypothesis of no effect). 
 
For real per capita state spending on hospitals, we find strong support for 
our hypothesis. The relationship between spending and AMT coverage is un-
iformly negative and is statistically significant when multiway dependence 
within states and within years is accounted for. Our results suggest that if the 
fraction of income tax filers with incomes above $50,000 that had to pay the 
AMT were to increase by one standard deviation, real state per capita hospital 
spending would decline by almost 18%. If a similar calculation is done for 
changes in AMT coverage among those earning more than $200,000, the cor-
responding decline in hospital spending is almost 25%. These results again 
suggest that this AMT subsidy effect is substantial. 
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In Table 6, we cover real state per capita public health spending. 
 
TABLE 6 
AMT Coverage and State Per Capita Public Health Spending 
(Standard Errors Clustered at the State Level in Parentheses) 
[Standard Errors Multiway Clustered at the State and Year Level in Brackets] 
      
AMT Share 
−625 
(1215) 
[1149] 
    
AMT Share 
50k+ 
 
−432 
(383) 
[351] 
   
AMT Share 
75k+ 
  
−313 
 (187)* 
 [166]* 
  
AMT Share 
100k+ 
   
−212 
  (93)** 
  [87]** 
 
AMT Share 
200k+ 
    
−277  
  (120)**  
  [78]*** 
Income 
0.012 
(0.010) 
 [0.007]* 
0.011 
(0.010) 
[0.007] 
0.010 
(0.010) 
[0.007] 
0.010 
(0.009) 
[0.006] 
0.006 
(0.006) 
 [0.003]* 
Note: Sample covers 2004-2007. All regressions are estimated with population weights. All regressions 
include state and year fixed effects. 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 (against a two-sided test of the null hypothesis of no effect). 
 
Real state per capita spending on public health also supports our hypothe-
sis. The relationship between AMT coverage and public health spending is un-
iformly negative, and it is statistically significant once attention is restricted to 
AMT filers earning more than $75,000 annually. Our results imply that real 
state per capita public health spending would decline by almost 19% if the 
share of filers covered by the AMT making more than $50,000 were to increase 
by one standard deviation. Restricting attention to those making more than 
$200,000, the expected decline is around 50%. 
 Despite the fact that data limitations generate significant precision prob-
lems, we find robust support for our hypothesis that as AMT coverage increas-
es, state spending on social insurance programs declines conditional on state 
per capita income. This evidence is consistent with our claim that the AMT acts 
as a fiscal stabilizer. 
B. Local Spending 
Our general argument applies to local government spending in addition to 
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state government spending. Unfortunately, data availability constraints force us 
to restrict our attention to 2004-2006 for any local expenditure analysis. Fur-
ther, it is generally the case that local expenditure figures will be noisier than 
state figures. With this in mind, we expect that local expenditure analyses will 
be significantly less precise and should be viewed descriptively. 
Local government expenditure data for the same spending categories are 
available from the U.S. Census Bureau.178 Table 7 provides descriptive statis-
tics for local spending in the areas of education, welfare, hospitals, and public 
health. 
 
TABLE 7 
Descriptive Statistics for Local Government Spending 
 
Variable Description Mean St. Dev. Source 
Spending 
Real local government spending per 
capita on education, welfare, hospitals, 
and public health 
1114 255 Census 
Education 
Spending 
Real local government spending per 
capita on education 
863 160 Census 
Welfare 
Spending 
Real local government spending per 
capita on welfare 
74 82 Census 
Hospital 
Spending 
Real local government spending per 
capita on hospitals 
106 73 Census 
Health 
Spending 
Real local government spending per 
capita on public health 
61 45 Census 
 
Note: Sample covers 2004-2006. All variables weighted by state population. 
 
 
178. State & Local Government Finance, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/govs/estimate/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2010). 
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In Table 8, we provide estimates of the effect of AMT coverage on total 
real per capita local government spending on social insurance programs. 
 
TABLE 8 
AMT Coverage and Local Per Capita Spending 
(Standard Errors Clustered at the State Level in Parentheses) 
[Standard Errors Multiway Clustered at the State and Year Level in Brackets] 
      
AMT Share 
  −16 
(3427) 
[2639] 
    
AMT Share 
50k+ 
 
 −197 
(1274) 
 [915] 
   
AMT Share 
75k+ 
  
−163 
 (793) 
 [559] 
  
AMT Share 
100k+ 
   
−101 
 (480) 
 [340] 
 
AMT Share 
200k+ 
    
−84 
(254) 
[276] 
Income 
 0.041 
(0.023)* 
[0.021]** 
 0.041 
(0.021)*  
[0.019]** 
 0.040 
(0.021)*  
[0.018]** 
 0.040 
(0.020)* 
[0.018]** 
 0.039 
(0.020)*  
[0.018]** 
Note: Sample covers 2004-2006. All regressions are estimated with population weights. All regressions 
include state and year fixed effects. 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 (against a two-sided test of the null hypothesis of no effect). 
 
As expected, we again find uniformly negative relationships between AMT 
coverage and real local government per capita spending on social insurance 
programs, but data limitations lead to very low precision. Interestingly, the rela-
tive effects estimated here are only about 20% as large as those estimated for 
state spending. Although we do not report results by category for local spend-
ing, we find that the difference between the state and local results is driven by 
the education and welfare categories where very little relationship between 
spending and AMT coverage is observed, whereas the coefficients for local 
hospital and public health spending are comparable to those observed in the 
state spending data. 
Although not as strong as the state spending results, these local spending 
estimates are also largely supportive of our hypothesis that the AMT changes 
the price of local government spending as it is perceived by taxpayers, especial-
ly those with higher incomes, and this translates to observable changes in local 
spending patterns in social insurance categories. This suggests that the AMT 
does function as an automatic fiscal stabilizer, inducing more local government 
GALLE AND KLICK 63 STAN. L. REV. 187 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2010 12:34 PM 
234 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:187 
spending during economic downturns and limiting it during times of economic 
growth. 
C. Revenue Effects 
The foregoing empirical results support our fiscal stabilization hypothesis. 
However, they represent a sort of “reduced form” analysis.179 Presumably, the 
changing relative price of public spending occasioned by changes in AMT cov-
erage leads to changes in the willingness of taxpayers to support state and local 
tax policy. In turn, this has an effect on spending.180 While the expenditure ef-
fects isolated above are our primary interest, providing evidence on the inter-
mediate revenue side increases confidence in our overall claim. 
 We collected data on state personal income tax revenue over the period 
for which we have AMT data (2004-2007)181 and analyzed the revenue coun-
terpart to the regressions presented above. Specifically, we regressed real per-
sonal income tax revenue per capita by state, controlling for real per capita in-
come, as well as state and year fixed effects. We again weight all regressions 
by state population. Results are provided in Table 9 below. 
 
179. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN 
APPROACH 518 (4th ed. 2009). 
180. In general, we think spending is the best measure of a state’s capacity to undertake 
countercyclical spending, since it includes both taxing and borrowing capacity. The AMT 
affects both: higher effective tax rates may impact borrowing by implying future liquidity 
problems for the state, leading rational voters to prefer to avoid taking on too much current 
government debt. We examine effects on revenues as well, however, because there might be 
political obstacles to cutting spending independent of cutting taxes. For instance, voters 
might doubt that officials will save excess revenues against future liquidity crunches, rather 
than just spending them at a politically useful later time. We thank Michael Knoll for raising 
this last point as a reason to be interested in the AMT’s effect on annual revenues. 
181. Data for 2004 to 2007 are available at State Government Tax Collections—
Historical Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/govs/statetax/historical 
_data.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2010). 
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TABLE 9 
AMT Coverage and State Per Capita Personal Income Tax 
(Standard Errors Clustered at the State Level in Parentheses) 
[Standard Errors Multiway Clustered at the State and Year Level in Brackets] 
      
AMT Share 
−19,911 
(11,050)* 
[11,816]* 
    
AMT Share 
50k+ 
 
−5540 
(5325) 
[5031] 
   
AMT Share 
75k+ 
  
−2278 
(2293) 
[2348] 
  
AMT Share 
100k+ 
   
−542 
(303)* 
[352] 
 
AMT Share 
200k+ 
    
−396 
(241) 
[200]** 
Income 
 0.056 
(0.013)*** 
[0.013]*** 
 0.048 
(0.018)** 
[0.015]*** 
 0.047  
(0.017)*** 
[0.014]*** 
 0.044 
(0.015)*** 
[0.013]*** 
 0.045  
(0.013)***  
[0.011]*** 
Note: Sample covers 2004-2007. All regressions are estimated with population weights. All regressions 
include state and year fixed effects. 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 (against a two-sided test of the null hypothesis of no effect). 
 
Although we are again dealing with imprecise estimates, there is robust 
evidence of a negative effect of AMT coverage on state income tax revenue 
conditional on state income.182 This provides the missing “middle step” in our 
causal chain whereby changing AMT coverage affects the price of state and lo-
cal spending, leading voters to change their support for state and local taxes, 
generating changes in spending. This finding provides additional confidence in 
our underlying hypothesis. 
VI. TWEAKING STATE AND FEDERAL TAX TO IMPROVE STABILITY 
So far we have set out the theoretical appeal of the AMT as an automatic 
stabilizer for state budgets. It cannot have escaped the reader’s attention that, 
notwithstanding our theory, states continue to experience financial crises. Our 
data imply that these crises have been milder as a result of the AMT. We ac-
knowledge, however, that there are at least two important practical obstacles 
 
182. Results are qualitatively similar for total tax revenue. We present only the personal 
income tax results because many components of total tax revenue would be unaffected by 
our causal mechanism (e.g., revenue from user fees). 
GALLE AND KLICK 63 STAN. L. REV. 187 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2010 12:34 PM 
236 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:187 
limiting the full efficacy of the AMT’s stabilization function. For one thing, 
taxpayers must actually be aware that their deduction has been restored in order 
for any preferences for higher taxes to register at the ballot box. Second, tax-
payers may anticipate that their earnings will soon rise, so that they may be-
lieve that any relief from the AMT will be short-lived. In this Part we explore 
these points in more detail and set out a handful of policy options for mitigating 
them.  
A. Problems Translating Federal Subsidies to State Revenues 
It could be argued that the AMT is not truly an automatic stabilizer for 
state budgets because it does not directly increase state revenues. Instead, as 
federal tax deductions for state taxes paid reduce the price of local spending 
relative to other available uses of taxpayers’ personal funds, voters are more 
willing to vote for tax rate increases, or to give political support to officials 
who increase tax rates.183  
1. Voter ignorance of AMT liability 
The AMT might not translate fully to the state level because voters may 
not take federal deductibility into account in forming their opinions about local 
tax policy.184 Taxpayers who did not take a SALT deduction in a prior year be-
cause of the AMT may be unaware that the deduction will become available 
when the AMT no longer applies. Others may simply be uncertain whether they 
will be subject to the AMT until they (or their preparers) calculate both stan-
dard and AMT liability the following April 15.185 Even those who can easily 
do the tax computation themselves may be unsure of their earnings between the 
time of a relevant political decision and the end of the tax year. Still other tax-
payers may simply fail to take available information into account.186 In each of 
these cases, voters may fail to approve higher state taxes, notwithstanding their 
 
183. See Kaplow, supra note 147, at 486-87. 
184. See The Individual Alternative Minimum Tax: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Finance, 110th Cong. 12 (2007) (statement of Leonard E. Burman, Director, Tax Policy 
Center); Kaplow, supra note 147, at 487. 
185. See Linda M. Beale, Congress Fiddles While Middle America Burns: Amending 
the AMT (and Regular Tax), 6 FLA. TAX REV. 811, 824-25 (2004); Leonard E. Burman et al., 
The AMT: Projections and Problems, TAX NOTES, July 7, 2003, at 105, 115-16. 
186. See Deborah Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes 27-28 
(NYU Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 10-37, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1661322. 
In laboratory studies, subjects had difficulty integrating in their heads the combined ef-
fects of two overlapping tax systems. See Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Po-
litical Psychology of Redistribution, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1765-68 (2005). It is unclear to 
what extent these laboratory studies capture real world behavior. See Brian Galle, Hidden 
Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59, 84 (2009). 
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federal deduction.  
Of course, officials can always simply attempt to educate voters when pro-
posing tax increases, but counterintuitively, many ordinary efforts to inform 
voters about the effects of the AMT have the potential to reduce overall politi-
cal support. Educational efforts may increase support for taxes among some 
voters,187 but should also increase lobbying efforts by those opposed to tax. To 
understand why, consider a world in which voters have complete information 
about one another’s finances. Voters ordinarily free ride on one another’s lob-
bying efforts, so that only extreme outliers, such as the rich, will themselves 
lobby.188 However, in a downturn, some voters will drop out of the AMT and 
become more supportive of tax increases. This means that rich voters still sub-
ject to the AMT cannot free ride on the efforts of the dropouts. Accordingly, if 
rich voters are aware of how many others are no longer subject to the AMT, 
they can calibrate their own lobbying efforts upwards to make up for the short-
fall.189 As a result, in the presence of the AMT the SALT deduction would not 
increase overall political support for tax increases.190  
In the real world voters do not have full information about one another, but 
that knowledge deficit in turn limits the efficacy of efforts to inform voters 
about the SALT deduction. If wealthy voters cannot observe the extent to 
which others in their jurisdiction can claim the SALT deduction (and thus the 
extent to which others would prefer higher local tax rates), the wealthy also do 
not know that they should ratchet up their own lobbying efforts.191 However, 
 
187. See Gillette, supra note 42, at 958 (arguing that political free riding diminishes 
when costs of acquiring information decline). 
188. See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND 
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 21-22, 31, 35 (rev. ed. 1971); Gillette, supra note 56, at 389. Of 
course, in many cases this story will be much more complex. See id. 
189. Cf. Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political Ad-
vocacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1207-15 (2008) (modeling argument that removing a like-
minded political actor will increase others’ lobbying efforts).  
190. We note that this result is dependent on the existence of the AMT, which prevents 
some taxpayers ever from receiving the benefit of the SALT deduction. In the absence of the 
AMT, the SALT deduction would actually be more politically appealing to wealthier tax-
payers, because the dollar value of a deduction increases as marginal tax rates increase. 
191. In many circumstances, these kinds of information deficits can be overcome by 
policy entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs invest their own effort in gathering and sharing informa-
tion, in exchange for rents and political support for their own cause from the beneficiaries. 
See Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment—Explanations 
for Environmental Laws, 1969-73, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 29, 49-56 (1998); Richard 
E. Wagner, Pressure Groups and Political Entrepreneurs: A Review Article, 1 PUB. CHOICE 
161, 164-67 (1966) (reviewing MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
(1965)). 
The entrepreneur story is implausible in our scenario because most of the important in-
formation is privately held by other taxpayers and perhaps by government insiders. Indeed, 
those who hold this information have incentives to keep it secret. See Galle, supra note 186, 
at 95 n.171. Therefore gathering the information is not simply a matter of investing time and 
effort—the data is literally inaccessible. Entrepreneur claims about hidden taxes may also 
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when public officials undertake widely observable efforts to inform voters 
about the effects of the SALT deduction, they also provide information to weal-
thy voters. The fact that the officials are bothering with education efforts im-
plies that the officials have private information about the existence of SALT-
eligible voters in the jurisdiction. And the scope and effectiveness of the educa-
tion campaign can be a surrogate source of information about increased support 
for tax hikes: the wealthy voters can calibrate their own increased lobbying to 
match the education campaign. Thus, on net, efforts to educate voters about 
their own SALT eligibility may simply increase opposition to tax rate increases 
among ineligible segments of the body politic.  
General educative efforts are also likely ineffective where the problem is 
the voter’s uncertainty about whether she will have AMT liability. Most tax-
payers file their returns for a given year in March or April of the following 
year.192 Over ten million more obtain extensions and file even later.193 As a re-
sult, at the time of a proposed tax increase, a voter may be uncertain what her 
income will be between the vote and the end of the year, and thus unsure about 
the effects of the AMT. This problem may be mitigated somewhat if the tax in-
crease is supported by officials who need not stand for election until after the 
next income tax filing season. But there are no data to tell us whether voters 
will remember to evaluate their official based on the net-of-federal-tax cost of 
any tax increases, or instead will remember only their anger at the time of the 
tax rate increase itself. 
2. Taxpayers anticipate later tax increases  
Another problem limiting the stabilizing potential of the AMT is the possi-
bility that taxpayers will anticipate future AMT liability. If the SALT deduction 
is available only because the taxpayer’s income has fallen due to a temporary 
condition, such as unemployment or underemployment, then the taxpayer may 
expect (or at least hope) that income will rise again in the future. In that case, 
the taxpayer may ignore the present lower effective tax rate and vote according 
to her expected, higher, future rate.194 Movers may not relocate until the higher 
effective rate actually kicks in, but if the jurisdiction and its officials want to 
avoid a later exodus, they must themselves anticipate the results of the AMT. 
An obvious fix to the anticipation problem is to make countercyclical tax 
increases temporary, but this fix may not be fully effective. For one thing, it is 
not clear that officials can credibly commit themselves to roll back rates or let 
 
have fairly low credibility. See id. at 91-92. 
192. See Filing Season Weekly Reports, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/ 
0,,id=184855,00.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2010). 
193. See Taukir Hussain, Projections of Federal Tax Return Filings: Calendar Years 
2005-2012, IRS STAT. INCOME BULL., Winter 2005-2006, at 147, 147-49. 
194. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 4, at 22. 
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temporary tax hikes expire.195 Again, the problem is that the political cost of 
failing to lower rates will fall on future officials, while the gains of meeting the 
budget crisis are realized immediately. In addition, there is a status quo bias in 
legislation: it is harder to enact change than to defend existing legislation.196 
That will tend to make it difficult to adjust rates downward again.197 While rate 
increases that automatically expire do not face that difficulty, they present the 
different one that they may expire before the state’s fiscal hardship is over.198  
3. Timing of the residual benefits of the AMT 
Having said all of this, we should note that the AMT offers some stabiliza-
tion benefits irrespective of whether federal subsidies translate to higher tax 
rates. At a minimum, lower federal taxes for regions suffering from a downturn 
means higher after-tax wealth for those regions. In effect, the AMT targets tax 
cuts to regions where economic stimulus is needed. In addition to this income 
effect, the deductibility of sales taxes and home equity loans creates substitu-
tion effects in favor of spending—assuming, at least, that consumers believe 
they will not be subject to the AMT for the year in which they make their pur-
chase.  
Federal subsidies also offer some support for state revenues even if tax 
rates do not increase. If retail sales increase (as a result of lower effective sales 
tax rates), then sales tax revenues do, too. Even if consumers expect their effec-
tive sales tax rate to rise in the future, that expectation itself can spur spending 
in the present while rates are lower. And capitalization of the net-of-tax cost of 
the local tax burden may increase home values, adding to property tax 
proceeds.  
Many of these benefits, however, may lag behind the onset of a recession. 
Again, timing stimulus to coincide with downturns is key to its effective-
ness.199 Most taxpayers, however, will only experience the economic benefit of 
a higher SALT deduction when they file their federal return for the following 
year, which may well be up to sixteen months after the recession starts. The 
savviest taxpayers might accelerate the gains through decreased withholding,200 
 
195. See Elizabeth Garrett, Comment, Accounting for the Federal Budget and Its 
Reform, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187, 195-96 (2004); Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: 
The Political Economy of Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335, 359-70 
(2006). 
196. See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 543, 561 (2007). 
197. Cf. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 29, at 283-95 (arguing that political dy-
namics allow incumbents to ratchet tax payments upwards). 
198. For an ingenious (but in our view pie-in-the-sky) proposed solution to this prob-
lem, see Gamage, supra note 5, at 123-43. 
199. See supra text accompanying notes 117-23. 
200. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 919: HOW DO I ADJUST MY TAX 
WITHHOLDING?, at 4-5, 11 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p919.pdf (ad-
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lower estimated quarterly federal tax payments,201 or loans.202 But policy plan-
ners should design their tax systems to maximize the extent to which the stimu-
lus effect of the SALT deduction is concentrated during downturns. We think 
this can be done together with interventions targeted at the other problems we 
have mentioned, as we will now outline.  
B. Some Policy Possibilities  
So far we have argued that the AMT already produces a modest stabiliza-
tion effect. In this Subpart we suggest some fairly simple (if in some cases 
counterintuitive) ways in which states themselves can make better use of feder-
al subsidies during downturns, and some tweaks to federal law that would fur-
ther improve the AMT’s stabilizer function.  
1. Tax the middle class . . . and the very rich 
The first tool states can adopt for themselves is to target their tax rate in-
creases to individuals who are unlikely to have AMT liability. Remember that 
the central political problem for states is that wealthy AMT payers are likely to 
increase their own lobbying efforts in response to evidence that other citizens 
are willing to pay higher taxes. But this problem only arises if the same tax 
rates are applied to both AMT payers and those who receive the federal subsi-
dy. If rates are increased only for subsidy recipients, the AMT payers have no 
reason to lobby.203 Indeed, they may prefer to receive some additional govern-
ment services for free. Targeting increases to those without AMT liability is 
also beneficial to the state because it maximizes the percentage of state tax rev-
enue eligible for a federal matching grant (via the SALT deduction), which the 
AMT turns off.204  
Precise targeting of the state’s tax increase may be difficult, but proxies are 
readily available. In theory a state income tax could well include a discount for 
 
vising taxpayers to match liabilities with withholding, taking into account factors such as 
state taxes, hence in effect advising taxpayers with higher expected state taxes to reduce their 
federal withholding). 
201. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 505: TAX WITHHOLDING AND 
ESTIMATED TAX, at 19-22, 36 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p505.pdf 
(explaining the obligation to make estimated quarterly payments for self-employed taxpay-
ers, and noting that payers should estimate the amount of deductions they will be allowed 
when making payments). 
202. For more information on refund anticipation loans, see Michael S. Barr, Banking 
the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 166-77 (2004). 
203. The opposite strategy of taxing only the wealthy faces an uphill battle, because in 
that case free riding among wealthy voters is even lower than in the AMT scenario. 
204. For our illustration of how this targeting can minimize the impact of tax increases 
on state residents, see supra Figures 1, 2. 
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those who pay the federal AMT.205 The worry here would be that the existence 
of this special discount would be far less salient politically than the general rate 
increase, leading some AMT payers nonetheless to oppose the rate hike. As a 
second-best solution, though, the state could simply calculate the income thre-
shold for most local AMT payers, and limit its rate increase to those below that 
threshold: to tax the middle class, in other words. Similarly, while there is no 
obvious way to limit property tax rates for those who pay AMT, a substitute 
(admittedly, inexact) would be to increase rates only on homes below a certain 
value.  
These targeted tax hikes could also fall on the very richest state taxpayers. 
Because the top AMT marginal rate is less than the maximum rate under the 
standard income tax, at very high incomes some taxpayers again escape the 
AMT. Thus, state tax hikes could also be targeted to kick in again at this upper 
threshold—as with the “millionaire’s tax.”  
As we have explained, though, a precisely targeted tax would not in fact 
increase the net-of-federal-tax burden on any state taxpayer.206 Thus, assuming 
that beneficiaries of the SALT deduction are aware of its effects, targeting 
should diminish political resistance to tax increases.  
Sales taxes present a thornier targeting problem, but one that probably 
doesn’t matter. Sales taxes can be crudely calibrated to fall less heavily on the 
poor by adjusting which items are subject to tax, as by taxing only luxuries or 
exempting bare necessities.207 But it is difficult to conceive of how to do the 
opposite: there are few meaningfully large categories of items that are pur-
chased only by low- and middle-income persons and not the wealthy.208 How-
ever, the wealthy pay a relatively low portion of their incomes in sales taxes.209 
Thus, the failure to exempt AMT payers from higher sales tax rates probably 
would not significantly increase political opposition to the increase. 
We acknowledge that of course this approach of exempting the wealthy 
from higher rates looks to be squarely contrary to most accounts of distributive 
 
205. For example, the state could award a credit against state tax liability for the lesser 
of the dollar value of the federal SALT deduction and the amount of federal AMT liability in 
excess of the standard tax. Such a credit would approximate the value of the federal deduc-
tion lost to the AMT. If the state calibrates its tax hike to roughly the value of the federal 
match, this credit would ensure that state taxpayers subject to the AMT would not expe-
rience any tax increase.  
206. See supra text accompanying notes 149-50. 
207. See Steven A. Bank, Origins of a Flat Tax, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 336-37 
(1996). 
208. The exception is junk food. See Jonah B. Gelbach, Jonathan Klick & Thomas 
Stratmann, Cheap Donuts and Expensive Broccoli: The Effect of Relative Prices on Obesity 
(Dec. 15, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=976484. 
209. See David Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. 
REV. 499, 501-02 (2000). 
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justice and fair progressivity in the tax system.210 That appearance is somewhat 
misleading, though. First, state rates net of federal tax may change only 
slightly, as we have explained.211 Second, countercyclical expenditures dispro-
portionately benefit lower-income residents.212 Taking into account both taxing 
and spending the targeted rate increases and associated higher spending may on 
net be beneficial to the state’s poorest, and not as negative for the middle class 
as a first glance would suggest. Finally, states could mitigate the regressivity of 
any targeting policy by also exempting very low-income taxpayers, granting 
property-tax exemptions for landlords of low-income housing, and avoiding 
sales tax hikes on essentials such as food and medicine.  
2. Exploit the natural salience of filing season 
Next, both state and federal law could build on the public’s increased 
awareness of the tax system around April 15 each year. We have hypothesized 
that voters’ failure to connect higher state taxes with lower federal taxes might 
limit the efficacy of the SALT deduction. By enacting increases around April 
15, when most taxpayers are filing their federal tax return, states could help 
voters to keep federal effects in mind when they form opinions about the state 
proposal. One recent study of tax incentives, for example, found that federal 
deductions are much more effective in changing consumer behavior around 
April 15 than other times of year.213  
This approach is superior to a more general education campaign, because it 
is unlikely to induce higher lobbying efforts by AMT payers. The timing of a 
tax increase proposal reveals little of officials’ information about the number of 
voters who will receive the SALT deduction. And AMT payers cannot substi-
tute for that information with the intensity of the education campaign. 
On the federal side, Congress might transplant a procedure already used for 
contributions to individual retirement accounts, and enact a statute permitting 
 
210. See JOSEPH M. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX: FEDERAL INCOME TAX THEORY AND 
POLICY 88 (1989). 
211. An important disclaimer here is that federal tax reductions in April of Year Two 
may not fully compensate a taxpayer for her higher state-tax expenses in Year One, even if 
the two are of equal present discounted value. Timing effects matter, and may be especially 
important for households that do not budget rationally or are highly liquidity constrained. 
See Brian Galle & Manuel Utset, Is Cap-and-Trade Fair to the Poor? Shortsighted House-
holds and the Timing of Consumption Taxes, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 33 (2010). 
212. See Batchelder et al., supra note 3, at 58. 
213. Kelly Sims Gallagher & Erich Muehlegger, Giving Green to Get Green: Incentives 
and Consumer Adoption of Hybrid Vehicle Technology 22-24, 28 (Harvard Univ. John F. 
Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Working Paper No. RWP08-009, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1083716 (finding increased efficacy of 
income tax incentives in the second quarter, and suggesting that this effect cannot easily be 
explained except as connected to tax filing season). It is not clear, however, that the study in 
fact establishes that there is a salience effect during tax filing season. See Galle, supra note 
186, at 76-77.  
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sales taxes incurred between January 1 and April 15 of Year Two to be deduct-
ible from the taxpayer’s Year One tax return.214 Under current law, only taxes 
paid during the applicable tax year are deductible.215 The problem, as we have 
shown, is that consumers may not know until the following April whether the 
sales taxes they pay will end up being deductible, which greatly reduces the 
value of the deduction as an incentive to consume. If sales tax were retroactive-
ly deductible, consumers would be able to be certain they were not subject to 
the AMT before making major purchases.216  
3. Accelerate rebates 
If states cannot prudently wait until tax filing season to raise more revenue, 
an alternative is to accelerate federal tax refunds, as has been done with federal 
tax stimulus checks in 2001 and 2009. Again, the concern is that state and local 
voters may be unaware at the time of a state funding decision that the SALT 
deduction will reduce the cost of any tax increase. If voters were to receive a 
significant portion of the SALT deduction “up front,” this problem could be 
greatly mitigated.  
For example, federal law might provide for a chunk of projected SALT de-
ductions to be mailed out upon enactment of an increase in a federally deducti-
ble tax by a state suffering from a downturn. Alternately, the state might send 
out checks at the time of or immediately in advance of a tax increase to taxpay-
ers it projects will receive a SALT deduction, and then collect those funds back 
at the end of the year on the state return.217 Similarly, the state might offer 
loans to its citizens, secured by the federal tax rebate. 
In addition to their informational advantage, these schemes also help to 
overcome a possible problem with the timing of the SALT deduction stimulus. 
 
214. See 26 U.S.C. § 219(f)(3) (2006).  
215. 26 U.S.C. § 164(a) (2006). 
216. One technical point perhaps worth mentioning about this proposal is that we would 
recommend slightly disfavoring retroactive deductions relative to taxes incurred during the 
tax year. For example, we would reduce the amount of retroactive deductions by about one-
third of the annual risk-free rate of return, to account for the time value of the taxpayer’s 
holding onto her money between December of Year One and April of Year Two. The reason 
is that we would want fully informed taxpayers to be indifferent between purchasing sooner 
rather than later: we would not want retroactive deductibility to be a reason for consumers to 
delay consumption. The reduction would also mitigate the federal revenue lost by accelerat-
ing some deductions. 
217. For example, Klick would receive a check from Pennsylvania for $600 in June of 
Year One, on the effective date of a new Pennsylvania tax increase that will cost him $600 
over the course of the year. In April of Year Two, when he files his state tax return, he would 
repay the $600 advance. At the same time, he would receive a $600 refund from the federal 
government. On net, Klick comes out even both in Year One and Year Two. We assume 
here that the state charges Klick no interest; that benefit is offset (from Klick’s perspective) 
by the fact that the federal government pays Klick no interest on the money he overpaid in 
Year One. 
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If taxpayers who are newly eligible to receive a SALT deduction fail to adjust 
their federal withholding to account for their lower expected federal tax liabili-
ty, they will not see any benefit from the deduction until they file their returns 
in the following year. That means that any increase in consumer spending dri-
ven by the federal money cannot help alleviate the current year’s recession.218 
Accelerating the rebate smoothes out that unwanted wrinkle. 
4. Guarantee deductibility 
Turning to the problem of anticipated future AMT liability, we have argued 
that states cannot likely make credible pledges to reduce taxes when crises 
pass, so federal intervention is needed. The difficulty, again, is that deductibili-
ty may not make a present tax increase more appealing if the taxpayer expects 
that her income will soon increase, making her subject to the AMT and elimi-
nating the deduction. Our proposed solution, then, is to make tax increases 
AMT protected. That is, Congress could guarantee that a deduction that bene-
fits a taxpayer this year will still benefit her next year, or potentially years after 
that.  
In essence, the way this would work is that the tax code would allow a tax-
payer who benefitted from the SALT deduction in a prior tax year to reduce her 
AMT income by the amount of state and local tax attributable to a recent tax 
rate increase. So, to illustrate, suppose a taxpayer who was not subject to the 
AMT in Year One. Also in Year One, Residence State increases its income tax 
by 2%, from 3% to 5%. In Year Two, when our taxpayer calculates her tenta-
tive AMT liability, she can deduct two-fifths of her state income taxes from her 
AMT income.  
Whether this protection would last only one year, or would be extended to 
future years as well, should depend on empirical research into the extent to 
which taxpayers anticipate future AMT liability when they respond to the 
SALT deduction. However, we would be inclined to limit protection to a rela-
tively short time. The longer the guarantee extends, the more it resembles an 
undifferentiated federal subsidy for state taxes. We have argued that the AMT 
is appealing precisely because it is not such a subsidy. 
The implementation of this proposal would also help to educate taxpayers 
about the SALT deduction. In order to compute their AMT liability, taxpayers 
would need to know their state tax rates, as well as any recent changes in state 
rates. Thus, we would require states to provide their taxpayers with this infor-
mation in a short form, much like the Form 1099 notices taxpayers routinely 
 
218. Taxpayers who were fully informed about their taxes and who had an unlimited 
ability to borrow would not face this timing challenge, since they could simply borrow 
against their expected rebate. But evidence suggests that borrowing even against fully ex-
pected tax rebates is incomplete. See, e.g., Matthew D. Shapiro & Joel Slemrod, Consumer 
Response to Tax Rebates, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 381, 392-93 (2003).  
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receive from their banks, scholarship providers, and investment brokers.219 
States could take the opportunity to indicate not only their nominal marginal 
rates, but also the average effective tax rate net of federal deductibility. 
5. Target state education efforts 
Finally, a relatively small-bore but potentially effective technique for in-
creasing the political effectiveness of SALT deductions would be for states to 
aim their educational efforts only at likely SALT beneficiaries. In this way, 
again, AMT payers could not easily observe the scope of educational efforts 
and would not be prompted to increase their own lobbying effort. For example, 
states could include explanations of the SALT deduction in the materials it pro-
vides to applicants for unemployment insurance or other new social insurance 
benefits applicants. These individuals are the most likely to have low or declin-
ing incomes that might signify disappearing AMT liability. Similarly, if proper-
ty tax rates were to increase only for homes above or below a certain value, the 
jurisdiction could provide advance notice of a proposed rate increase to those 
homes together with SALT and AMT education.  
CONCLUSION 
The AMT is, we admit, an unlikely place to find a solution to the problem 
of state finance in times of crisis.220 We have argued, though, that each of the 
more obvious candidates has serious flaws. States cannot tax, borrow, or save 
enough to meet their residents’ needs for social insurance. Other federal sup-
ports lead to moral hazard, are wasteful, or are too poorly timed to be effective. 
Thus automatic stabilizers assume an important role in smoothing incomes. 
And, as we have shown empirically, the AMT is a powerful automatic stabiliz-
er. 
Accordingly, we would resist efforts to repeal or “patch” the AMT.221 In-
stead, we suggest that greater attention to the details of the AMT, and the tax 
lawmaking process that surrounds it, can greatly improve state responsiveness 
to recessions. We have noted some preliminary possibilities here, but no doubt 
 
219. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6049 (2006) (requiring payors of interest to file information 
return with IRS and furnish payment information to payee). 
220. See Paul Kane, Democrats Finishing Up Stimulus Proposal, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 
2009, at A4 (“I’m not aware of the AMT having any stimulative effect.” (quoting U.S. Rep-
resentative Jim Cooper)).  
221. Among repeal proponents are the leading tax-lawyer organizations, along with 
many former high-ranking tax officials. See Allen Kenney, Former Commissioners Say It’s 
Time to Scrap AMT, 103 TAX NOTES 1466 (2004); ABA Section of Taxation et al., Tax Sim-
plification Recommendations from ABA, AICPA, and TEI, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 25, 
2000, available at LEXIS 2000 TNT 39-82. One of the few in agreement with us on the fu-
ture of the AMT is Deborah Schenk, who offers it as a second-best solution to political fail-
ures in other tax-setting mechanisms. Schenk, supra note 186, at 50-51.  
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others could add to our list. 
Even for those who reject our arguments about the usefulness of the AMT 
as an automatic stabilizer, our empirics themselves are worth some attention. 
We have demonstrated that the existence of the AMT very likely curtails state 
spending in several important categories. For those who would prefer to see 
greater state support for education, health, and aid to the poor irrespective of 
the business cycle, we offer evidence that the AMT should be repealed.  
Our data are also relevant to other academic debates. For example, we pro-
vide evidence in favor of Professor Listokin’s general model of the tax code as 
automatic stabilizer. Our data also suggest that the deductibility of state and lo-
cal taxes positively affects state spending, a point of controversy among several 
prominent economists.222 Finally, we contribute to the literature on tax salience 
by showing that higher-income taxpayers are more likely to anticipate their 
own future AMT liability and translate that knowledge into political action. 
 
 
 
222. For a description of the controversy and summary of the existing data, see supra 
note 147. 
